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“It has been suggested that there are three criteria by which to judge 
the merits of administrative procedures; accuracy of the decisions, 
efficiency in the decision making and acceptable procedures…an 
administrator’s natural concern is to complete their administrative 






                                            
 
1Lawrence Baxter Administrative Law (1984) at 215 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
“Section 4 in the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (the 
PAJA) is a great achievement for South African administrative law, and its 
very presence in the PAJA is likely to have a positive effect on the rate and 
quality of participation in administrative decision-making.2 Despite the 
accuracy of this statement, how costly is public participation to efficient 
administrative action?  
In terms of section 4 of the PAJA, in cases where an administrative 
action materially and adversely affects the rights of the public, to give effect 
to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator, must 
decide whether to hold a public inquiry, follow a notice and comment 
procedure, follow both a public inquiry and notice and comment procedure, or 
where an administrator is empowered by any empowering provision, follow a 
procedure which is fair but different or to follow any procedure that gives 
effect to section 33 of the PAJA4. However, if reasonable and justifiable in the 
circumstances, an administrator may depart from the requirement to involve 
the public in the administrative decision. In determining whether a departure 
from the public participation procedure is reasonable and justifiable, several 
factors must be taken in account; one such factor is the need to promote an 
efficient administration and good governance. To what degree should the 
public accept this departure?   
 The PAJA’s preamble sets out its purpose, which is to promote an 
efficient administration and good governance, and create a culture of 
accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration.5 It 
can thus be said that an efficient administration is an important aspect of just 
administrative action. This paper considers the instances where public bodies 
departed from the requirements of section 4 of the PAJA through a proper 
assessment of case law and case studies. It considers practical examples of 
administrative action by South African public entities and instances where the 
public participation process affected the efficiency of the administrator and 
the consequences thereof. This paper seeks to answer the question ‘Why is 
creating a culture of transparency and public participation so important to 
lawful, reasonable and procedural fair administrative action?’  
                                            
 
2 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) at 83. 
3 Section 3 of the PAJA “Procedurally fair administrative action affecting any person” –
Section 3 sets out the requirements of a fair procedure relating to administrative action. 
4 Section 4(1)(a)–(e) of PAJA. 
5 Preamble of the PAJA  “AND IN ORDER TO – 
* promote an efficient administration and good governance; and 
* create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration 
or in the exercise of a public power or the performance of a public function, by giving effect 
to the right to just administrative action. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Justice Sachs in the Residents of Joe Slovo Community6 judgment provides 
some explanation of what it means to be a South African living in the new 
constitutional democracy. Sachs J explains that constitutional democracy 
concerns the responsibility that government has to “secure the ample 
benefits of citizenship promised for all by the Constitution.”7 The concept of 
citizenship goes beyond the historical notions of electoral rights; it focuses on 
the duty of citizens to be active, participatory and responsible for making their 
own collective and individual contributions towards the entitlements that they 
claim.8 Democracy stems from the idea of self-government; the people must 
be ruled only by themselves.9 There are several popular types of democracy: 
representative, direct and participatory. “Representative” affords more or less 
discretion to individual representatives or to political parties, whereas “direct” 
is achieved through either a referendum or an initiative. Participatory 
democracy, on the other hand, acknowledges that a modern state demands 
that representatives take decisions that affect the public, but it requires 
extensive participation in the political affairs by the citizens.10 
Our courts have upheld one of the fundamental principles of 
democracy: participatory democracy.11 South Africa’s democratic 
government is partly representative and partly participatory; it is also 
accountable and transparent.12 The Constitutional Court has affirmed that 
                                            
 
6Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 
(3) SA 454 (CC). 
7Residents of Joe Slovo supra (note 6) para 408. 
8Ibid  
9M Bishop “Vampire or Prince? The listening Constitution and Marafong Demarcation Forum 
and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others” (2009) 2 Constitutional 
Court Review at 313. 
10Ibid at 320. 
11Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 




participation is part of our constitutional framework. It is for this reason that 
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (the PAJA)13, which is the 
national legislation enacted to give effect to the section 33 right to just 
administrative action, includes section 4 that considers public participation an 
essential element to give effect to procedurally fair administrative action that 
affects the public. Clearly, the idea of self-government and public 
participation has significant importance, as section 4 of the PAJA states the 
following: 
(1) In cases where an administrative action materially and adversely 
affects the rights of the public, an administrator, in order to give effect 
to the right to procedurally fair administrative action must decide 
whether: 
(a) To hold a public inquiry in terms of subsection (2); 
(b) To follow a notice and comment procedure in terms of subsection 
(3); 
(c) To follow the procedures in both subsections (2) and (3);  
(d) Where the administrator is empowered by any empowering 
provision to follow another appropriate procedure which gives 
effect to section 3 
(2) If an administrator decides to hold a public inquiry— 
(a) the administrator must conduct the public inquiry or appoint a 
suitably qualified person or panel of persons to do so; and 
(b) the administrator or the person or panel referred to in paragraph 
(a) must— 
(i) determine the procedure for the public inquiry, which must— 
(aa)  include a public hearing; and 
(bb) comply with the procedures to be followed in connection 
with public inquiries, as prescribed; 
(ii) conduct the inquiry in accordance with that procedure; 
(iii) compile a written report on the inquiry and give reasons for 
any administrative action taken or recommended; and 
(iv) as soon as possible thereafter— 
(aa)  publish in English and in at least one of the other official 
languages in the Gazette or relevant provincial Gazette a 
                                            
 
13 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2 of 2000. 
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notice containing a concise summary of any report and the 
particulars of the places and times at which the report may 
be inspected and copied; and 
(bb)   convey by such other means of communication which the 
administrator considers effective, the information referred 
to in item (aa) to the public concerned. 
(3) If an administrator decides to follow a notice and comment procedure, 
the administrator must— 
(a) take appropriate steps to communicate the administrative action to 
those likely to be materially and adversely affected by it and call 
for comments from them; 
(b) consider any comments received; 
(c) decide whether or not to take the administrative action, with or 
without changes; and 
(d) comply with the procedures to be followed in connection with 
notice and comment procedures, as prescribed. 
(4) (a) If it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, an 
administrator may depart from the requirements referred to in 
subsections (1) (a) to (e), (2) and (3). 
(b) In determining whether a departure as contemplated in paragraph (a) 
is reasonable and justifiable, an administrator must take into 
account all relevant factors, including— 
(i) the objects of the empowering provision; 
(ii) the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the 
administrative action; 
(iii) the likely effect of the administrative action; 
(iv) the urgency of taking the administrative action or the urgency 
of the matter; and 
(v) the need to promote an efficient administration and good 
governance. 
 
This paper considers why public participation is essential for 
procedurally fair administrative action and whether the requirements listed in 
section 4(1)(a)–(d) of the PAJA are necessary to obtain procedurally fair 




Section 33(3)(c)14 of the Constitution envisaged that national legislation, 
enacted to give effect to the right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
administrative action, should promote an efficient administration. Through an 
analysis of the development of public participation and an examination of the 
requirement of public engagement as set out in section 4 of PAJA, this paper 
seeks to answer whether public participation promotes or hinders the 
prospect of an efficient administration. 
Recent decisions taken by the South African government imply that 
government may have an adverse attitude towards public participation. This 
is gleaned from examples such as the Western Cape school closures, where 
the Western Cape High Court found that the public consultation process 
followed had been inadequate;15 the public outcry regarding the lack of 
“meaningful” public participation prior to the implementation of e-tolling; and 
the North Gauteng High Court’s decision that the public engagement process 
was inefficient.16  
Public participation is clearly a current and contentious issue. The 
process of public participation, specifically meaningful public participation, 
can increase the bureaucratic red tape that so enmeshes public bodies. 
Through careful consideration of current South African case law, this paper 
examines how the courts have interpreted section 4 of the PAJA. The debate 
                                            
 
14Section 33 of the Constitution states that: 
“(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair, 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the 
right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National Legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must – 
(a) Provide for the review of administrative action by a court or where appropriate, an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) Impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and 
(c) Promote an efficient administration. [own emphasis] 
15Jane Etheridge “Western Cape Schools Closures set aside” News 24 available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Western-Cape-school-closures-set-aside-
20130731, accessed on 14 September 2014. 
16Staff Writer “Court dismisses application to scrap Gauteng e-tolls” Business Day Live 
available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/2012/12/13/court-dismisses-application-to-




surrounding public participation is significant, as current events in the one 
party dominant state of South Africa reveal. This research paper attempts to 
elucidate what is on many South Africans’ minds: are we involved in 
decisions that affect us, and if we are not, is South Africa going back to the 
sovereign state regime that is the legacy of Apartheid? 
The paper is divided into six chapters including this introduction. The 
second chapter considers the background and history behind the need for a 
culture of transparency and accountability. The third chapter examines public 
participation as embedded in legislation enacted to give effect to the 
constitutional right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative 
action, section 4 of the PAJA. Section 4(4) of the PAJA consents to an 
administrator departing from the requirements involving public participation 
under section 4 of the PAJA, where it is reasonable and justifiable to do so. 
Chapter 4 considers the administrative law concepts of “reasonableness” and 
“justifiability”, and cases where there has been a departure from the 
requirements of section 4 of the PAJA and the consequences of such a 
departure. The final two chapters scrutinise the notion of “an efficient 
administration” and compare public participation and administrative law in 
other jurisdictions.  
By focusing on both international and South African jurisprudence, the 
paradigm of efficiency versus participation will begin to break down. This 
paper sheds light on the value of participation and aims to provide answers to 





CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY TO THE NEED FOR A 
CULTURE OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
2.1 Introduction 
The Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 
1996 (the Constitution) opens with the following:  
“We, the people of South Africa, recognise the injustices of our past; 
honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land...We 
therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this 
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to ....lay the 
foundation for a democratic and open society in which government is 
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by 
law;” 17(own emphasis) 
Section 1 of the Constitution states the following: 
“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state 
founded upon the following values:  
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement 
of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) … 
(c) … 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular 
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to 
ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness” (own 
emphasis)18 
 
Section 19 of the Constitution provides for a participatory and 
representative democracy, where each citizen is free to participate in the 
activities of, and recruit members for, a political party. It is understood that 
the PAJA19 is the national legislation enacted to give effect to the right to 
administrative action that is efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair.20 
                                            
 
17 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 – Preamble. 
18 Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
19 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
20 Section 33 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
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The PAJA’s preamble establishes its purpose, which is to promote an 
efficient administration, assist in good governance and create a culture of 
accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration or in 
the exercise of public power.21 Public participation is a key element used to 
attain the goal of procedurally fair administrative action that adversely affects 
the public. A proper understanding of why public participation is a 
requirement of procedural fair administrative action can be better understood 
by considering administrative law pre-1994, as it is clear that government at 
that time significantly lacked transparency and accountability. 
2.2 Pre-1994 Administrative Law 
2.2.1 The rules of natural justice relating to participation 
Natural justice not only requires a public authority to use its powers 
reasonably, it also requires it to exercise its power in a procedurally fair 
manner.22 This precept stems from the principles of natural justice which 
prescribe that any person affected by administrative action should be given a 
fair and unbiased hearing before the decision is taken.23 These principles of 
natural justice are expressed in the form of the two Latin maxims: audi 
alteram partem “hear the other side” and nemo iudex in propria causa “no 
one may be a judge in his own case”.24 
Theorists, such as Etienne Mureinik argue that democracy is closely 
linked to a responsive government. However, the idea of responsiveness can 
be a confusing concept. Does the idea of a responsive government demand 
that people participate in decisions that affect them or does it describe a 
government that is accountable to the people it governs?25 Etienne 
                                            
 
21The Preamble to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
22 Lawrence Baxter Administrative Law (1984) at 536. 
23Ibid at 536. 
24Ibid. 
25Etienne Mureinik “Reconsidering Review: Participation and Accountability” in TW Bennett 
et al (eds) Administrative Law Reform (1993) at 36. 
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Mureinik26 argues that by participating in a decision that affects one, an 
opportunity to affect the content of that decision is created, which can 
ultimately influence the outcome.27 
Prior to the enactment of the South African Constitution and the PAJA,28 
Government refused to satisfy the public’s demand to be heard prior to it 
taking decisions. Government’s justification was that only when a decision 
affected the rights of a person, would the laws of natural justice apply.29 In 
essence, the narrow interpretation of “affect” would mean that public 
participation and the right to be heard were limited to decisions that deprive a 
person of a prior legal right. This, Mureinik describes as the deprivation 
theory of natural justice.30 However, a broad interpretation of the word 
“affect” would mean that a person may demand public participation if the 
decision taken by the administration affected a person’s right, or if the 
decision could determine what a person’s rights are.31 This is described as 
the determination theory.  
Prior to 1994, South African jurisprudence had elements of both the 
deprivation theory and the determination theory.32 In the matter of Laubscher 
v Native Commissioner Piet Retief,33 Mr Laubscher, an attorney practising in 
Benoni who had acted for a certain Zulu Tribe residing on various farms in 
the Piet Retief District, sought an appeal.34 The appeal was a direct result of 
the decision by the Natives Commission to refuse Laubscher’s application to 
                                            
 
26 Mureinik op cit (n25) at 35. 
27 Ibid. 
28The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 




33Laubscher v Native Commissioner, Piet Retief 1958 (1) SA 546 (A). 
34S v Laubscher Supra (n33) at 552. 
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visit the property for professional purposes as per the Native Trust Land Act 
18 of 1936.35 
Laubscher appealed on the basis that an enquiry had not been held. In 
the court’s view, Laubscher had no right to enter the “native land”; his rights 
and privilege only arose once the commissioner had granted him the 
permission. Laubscher’s appeal was dismissed on the basis that an official 
was required by statute to exercise a purely administrative discretion, and the 
official was under no obligation to provide the applicant with any information 
upon which the decision was based.36 
However, in the matter of Hack v Venterspost Municipality and Others,37 
the court held that the theory that a body acts administratively only if its 
function is to deprive a person of an existing right is a narrow test. The court 
held that this test would then exclude liquor licensing boards and 
transportation boards, which are clearly administrative boards.38 It is 
sufficient if the decisions by the body affect the rights of the subject.39 As a 
general rule, a tribunal or a body when exercising its functions should not do 
so in an arbitrary way, but as a result of an enquiry into matters of fact and 
law, these decisions may affect the rights of individuals.40 
Both the deprivation and the determination theories posed problems for 
Administrative Law pre-1994. Whereas the deprivation theory was too narrow 
and led to administrative decisions being taken without any form of 
participation, the determination theory was far too wide and imposed 
procedural constraints that frustrated Government’s effectiveness.41 By the 
1990s, a more progressive move towards public participation had been 
                                            
 
35Supra (n33) at 550. 
36Laubscher v Native Commissioner, Piet Retief 1958 (1) SA 546 (A) at 551. 
37Hack v Venterspost Municipality 1950 (1) SA172 (W). 
38Hack v Venterspost Municipality supra (n37) at 189. 
39Supra (n37) at 190. 
40Ibid. 
41Mureinik op cit (n25) at 37. 
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adopted by courts of apartheid South Africa, which saw the courts use the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation to govern participation. 
This doctrine, which can be said to be an expansive version of the 
deprivation theory, accepts that the right to participate in a decision should be 
given to those who are at risk of being deprived of a legal right or an 
expected right.42 In The Administrator, Transvaal v Traub43, the court had to 
assess whether the rules of natural justice and in particular the audi alteram 
partem principle were restricted to individuals with existing rights or whether it 
had a wider impact;44 the applicants had a legitimate expectation that they 
would be appointed based on a long standing practice at the provincial 
hospital. The applicants had signed a letter shedding light on the 
unacceptable conditions at the Baragwanath Hospital following which the 
provincial authority refused to confirm their appointments. The court held that 
although the applicants did not have an existing right to be appointed to the 
posts for which they had applied, they had a legitimate expectation that once 
they had applied for the posts and their posts had been recommended, an 
appointment would follow as this had been common practice.45 The court 
held that a legitimate expectation included expectations that went beyond 
enforceable legal rights, provided it had some reasonable basis. 
From 1980 and up until 1994, many administrative decisions affecting 
public were termed “legislative decisions”46 because the actions by public 
bodies regulated the affairs of the people. Where a public body decided to 
issue a removal order directing an entire group of people to be shifted from 
one area to another area, as was the case in the enforcement of the Group 
Areas Act 41 of 1950, this would be termed a legislative decision. Even 
though such administrative action affected the existing or potential interests 
                                            
 
42Ibid. 
43Administrator, Transvaal v Traub 1989 (1) SA 731 (A). 
44Supra (n43) at 748. 
45Supra (n43) at 761. 
46Baxter op cit (n22) at 580. 
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of individuals drastically, because it was termed a legislative decision 
affecting the public, the right to a hearing did not exist,47 as prior to 1991 the 
South African courts had established that a group of individuals affected by 
legislation could not demand a hearing. It would appear, therefore, that 
courts in the past relied on certain administrative acts affecting many rather 
than merely one as an excuse.48 
2.2.2 South African administrative law as it emerged from the Westminster 
system 
Following the Westminster system, the South African government positioned 
the judiciary as an inferior body to the “democratically” elected parliament.49 
In the pre-democratic era, the Supreme Court of South Africa created a set of 
principles that had developed into “administrative law”. These principles 
relied heavily on English administrative law and the English doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty,50 which restrained the courts’ powers. Whilst the 
courts had the power of judicial review in terms of the legality of 
administrative conduct, parliament assumed the ultimate power when 
considering the legality of administrative action.51  
In the British Commonwealth, administrative law practitioners would 
focus their attention on the right to a fair hearing and fair decisions in terms of 
decisions relating to individuals. However, there had been very little 
examination of using what Baxter52 describes as a “rule-making process” to 
enhance public participation in administrative action such as the formulation 
                                            
 
47Baxter op cit (n22) at 581. 
48Ibid. 
49 D M Davis “Administrative Justice in a Democratic South Africa” in TW Bennett et al (eds) 
Administrative law Reform (1993) 27. 
50Cora Hoexter Administrative Law of South Africa (2007) at 13. 
51Ibid.  
52Lawrence Baxter “Rule-making and policy formation in South African Law Reform” (1993) 
176 Acta Juridica at 176. 
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of legislation. The effect of executive control placed responsibility and 
accountability relating to policy formulation in the hands of the cabinet.53 
The notion of “rule-making” is an American administrative law concept. 
It involves a set of flexible procedures that a public body follows when it 
wishes to develop standards to bind the public. These “binding standards” 
must then be published together with a reasonable explanation of their 
purpose, while inviting the public to comment either in written or in oral form. 
Once these comments have been received, the public body analyses all 
comments and adopts the standard in response to those comments.54 
South Africa’s pre-constitutional administrative law, however, contained 
features of a system that was “hostile to the basic principles of rule-
making.”55 Although the principles of natural justice, in terms of the audi 
alteram partem, embraced some characteristics of participation to promote 
an accountable government, its primary concern was to ensure a fair 
administrative decision regarding the individual.56 The principle does not 
“contemplate the kind of mass access that is required for such decisions.” 57 
The 1966 judgment in Pretoria City Council v Modimola 58 is a clear 
example of the view that administrative decisions affecting a large number of 
people should be included in the audi alteram partem principle. The case was 
an appeal to the Transvaal Provincial Division concerning the expropriation of 
Mr Modimola’s property in terms of the Group Areas Development Act 69 of 
1955. The court a quo held that the Pretoria City Council had to give 
Mr Modimola an opportunity to be heard before his property was 
expropriated.59 However on appeal, Botha JA held that the expressed maxim 
of audi alteram partem was an annunciation of the principle of natural justice. 
                                            
 
53Baxter op cit (n52) at 182. 
54Ibid at 178. 
55Ibid at 184. 
56Ibid. 
57Baxter op cit (n52) at 186. 
58Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1996 (3) SA 250 A. 
59Supra at 260. 
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Where the principle of natural justice has been violated, the legislature 
implicitly incorporates the principle of audi alteram partem.60 Botha JA, drew 
on the Sachs v Minister of Justice61 matter and held that if individuals’ liberty 
or property was affected, then the principles of audi alteram partem must be 
applied, but where the statute that empowered the administrative action 
affects the members of a whole community, the principles of natural justice 
have not been violated, and therefore the audi alteram partem principle 
would not apply.  
Judges of the pre-constitutional era feared “over-extending” natural 
justice,62 as was the case in S v Moroka63 1969 (2) SA 394 (A) 398, where 
the accused was convicted of occupying certain buildings administered by 
the South African Bantu Trust that would have been used for grazing stock. 
The Bantu Affairs Commission issued a notice which inter alia stated that the 
property rights of the members of that community had been terminated. The 
court held that even though the notice had been “published” by placing it on 
the Bantu Affairs Office Notice Board, the audi alteram partem principle did 
not apply because the commissioner of Bantu Affairs had the necessary 
authority to make a decision that affected the interest of the community as a 
whole. 
These principles regarding public administrative action that adversely 
affected the public were applied throughout South African jurisprudence up 
until the 1990s when the tide changed slightly in favour of more genuine 
public participation. In the matter of South African Roads Board v 
Johannesburg City Council,64 the South African Roads Board intended to 
construct a major motorway, and in the process the N13 was converted into a 
temporary toll road to obtain funds for the project.65 The Johannesburg City 
                                            
 
60Supra (n58) at 261. 
61Sachs v Minister of Justice 1934 AD 11. 
62 Baxter op cit (n22) 581. 
63S v Moraka 1969 (2) SA 394 (A) at 398. 
64South African Roads Boards v Johannesburg City Council 1991 (4) SA 1 (A). 
65Supra (n64) at 723. 
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Council objected to the construction of a temporary toll road on account of 
the inevitable increase in traffic from the residential suburbs of Johannesburg 
who would use these residential suburban routes to avoid paying the toll.66 
The main issue of contention raised in the appeal was whether the erection 
of a toll gate on a national road was ultra vires as the City Council had not 
been given a hearing prior to the decision being taken. This was clearly a 
legislative act taken by the Roads Board and the question was whether this 
legislative act was subject to the rules of natural justice, including the audi 
principle.67 
The City Council argued that the action by the Roads Board affected its 
property rights as the creation of a toll road would lead to traffic being 
diverted.68 The Roads Board argued that its decision to have the road 
declared a toll road was by its nature a “legislative act”, and therefore the 
audi alteram partem rule did not apply.69 Milne JA considered the 
developments surrounding the audi principle as a rule of natural justice and 
expressed that the courts have preferred the view that the principles of 
natural justice are not violated in instances where a statute authorised a 
public authority to affect the property rights of members of a community. It 
follows that should the authority refuse the community member the right to be 
heard, the principles of natural justice are not violated as the public decision 
is taken under statute.70 The modern approach to administrative action is to 
consider the nature and facts of each case, Milne JA held that the court had 
moved away from the classification of administrative action and where 
statutory powers cause prejudice to a particular group of individuals, the rules 
of natural justice apply unless expressly excluded by statute. Milne JA was in 
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favour of the court a quo’s decision to set aside the Roads Board’s decision 
and dismissed the appeal.71 
2.2.3 Un-democratic South Africa 
Democracy has been described as “the people’s rule”, and that 
constitutionalism restrains power and codifies the rules that enable 
democracy.72 However, as early as the 1800s, the Boer Republics sought an 
alternative source of constitutionalism to that of the English idea of 
constitutionalism.73 In the traditional forms of administrative law, bureaucratic 
power is often authorised by a representative legislature and policed by the 
courts, meaning that the traditional view of controlling public power focuses 
on the judiciary and judicial review.74 Although pre-democratic South Africa 
was racist at heart, it adopted the ultra vires doctrine, which later became a 
founding principle of administrative law. The courts used ultra vires as a 
ground for judicial review; however, as the courts adjusted to the pressure of 
the growing government and the increase in administrative action, the 
grounds for judicial review expanded to encompass procedural unfairness, 
substantive unfairness and gross unreasonableness.75 
The autocratic government of pre-1994 South Africa and its version of 
administrative law focused heavily on judicial review, but this could not be the 
“sole institution of administrative law”; legislation and the common law also 
have a role to play.76 The South African government concentrated an 
enormous amount of power in the hands of the executive and the state 
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administration77 expressing a clear notion that “government knew best”. The 
judiciary in pre-democratic South Africa limited its involvement in executive 
matters. In the early 1800s, the Volksraad adopted legislation denying the 
courts’ power of judicial review. Despite the then Orange Free State having 
adopted a constitution, the High Court held that although the constitution at 
the time provided for judicial review of state action, the legislation had to be 
interpreted in accordance with the mores of the Voortrekkers, which in short 
meant denying the majority people of South Africa the right to judicial 
review.78 
2.3 The development of the concepts of “lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair” administrative action 
2.3.1 Lawfulness 
Lawfulness and the principle of legality are concepts that are equal in nature, 
and have often been used interchangeably. The principle of legality is one of 
the founding values of the rule of law, and applies to the exercise of public 
power.79 In the past, the requirements of lawfulness or legality were applied 
inconsistently and confined to compliance with the provisions of enabling 
legislation.80 Early administrative law focused on the interpretation and 
limitation of administrative power. As administrative law developed, the focus 
shifted from the limitation of public power to the promotion of a “good public 
administration”.81 The courts began to consider the effect of administrative 
decisions on the public,82 and it is in this context that the courts developed 
the “grounds of administrative law – lawfulness, fairness and 
reasonableness”.83 
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In the past, the concept of lawfulness meant that other common law 
requirements such as reasonable, clear and understandable administrative 
action did not need to be complied with. This narrow and legalistic view did 
not conform to the principle of administrative legality which forms the basis of 
the exercise of lawful administrative action.84 The modern day concept of 
“lawfulness” is interpreted widely to include compliance with the 
Constitution,85 any enabling legislation and the rules of the common law.86 
Bearing this in mind, it can be said that lawfulness is an “umbrella concept” 
as it encompasses all the requirements of valid administrative action.87 
Lawful administrative action describes administrative actions and decisions 
that have been duly authorised by law and that meet all the requirements 
listed in the provisions or statute enabling such action.88 As the right to 
administrative justice is embedded in the Constitution,89 judicial review has 
therefore been “constitutionalised” and has extended the common law 
principles of reasonableness, procedural fairness and lawfulness.90 
Therefore any legislation or action that infringes on these rights can be 
challenged as unconstitutional, unless the legislation is justified by section 36 
of the Constitution (the limitations clause).91 The constitutional requirement of 
lawfulness demanded by section 33(1) of the Constitution92 corresponds with 
the common law principle of legality. The principle of legality is the idea that 
administrators and other public actors have to act lawfully, and that the 
exercise of public power is only legitimate where it is lawful.93  
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The principle of legality was originally an extension of the ultra vires 
doctrine that originated in South Africa’s Westminster past. The ultra vires 
doctrine, simply put, does not permit an administrative body to exceed its 
“objective powers”.94 In South African administrative law today, the principle 
of legality and the requirement of lawfulness as intertwined concepts have 
grown to include common law principles such that administrative action must 
be clear and understandable and not vague and embarrassing, or arbitrary 
and irrational.95 
As the concept of lawfulness developed within the South African 
common law, the courts created more detailed grounds of review using the 
broad concept of “legality”.96 The requirements for judicial review are 
contained in section 6 of the PAJA and therefore any non-compliance with 
the grounds for review as laid down in section 6 is considered unlawful 
action.97 The PAJA makes specific provisions for administrative action that 
would have been regarded as ultra vires, namely: section 6(2)(a)(i), which 
stipulates that an administrator must be competent and authorised by an 
empowering provision to make a decision; 6(2)(a)(ii), which refers to an 
unauthorised delegation of authority; 6(2)(e)(i), which relates to action taken 
for a reason that is not authorised by an empowering provision; and 6(2)(f)(i), 
where the action itself is a contravention of a law or is not authorised by an 
empowering provision.98 
Under the parliamentary sovereignty system, Parliament had the 
authority to exclude judicial review of administrative action via “ouster 
clauses”.99 These clauses were popular in South Africa under the state of 
emergency during the 1980s where individuals were arrested and detained 
without trial. These clauses curtailed fundamental rights such as freedom of 
                                            
 
94Burns and Beukes op cit (n80) at 204. 
95Ibid. 
96Hoexter op cit (n50) at 224. 
97Burns & Beukes op cit (n80) at 204. 
98Ibid.  
99Ibid at 206. 
19 
 
speech, association and movement.100 During this time, the courts would not 
accept that they were restricted from proceeding with judicial review. With the 
introduction of the Interim Bill of Rights,101 a culture of justification developed. 
Everyone had a right to “lawful administrative action” under section 24(a) of 
the Interim Constitution; ouster clauses were therefore permanently annulled 
due to the constitutional right to lawful administrative action.102 The 
constitutional right to lawful administrative action attacks legislative 
provisions that attempt to isolate administrative action from judicial review.103 
2.3.2 Reasonableness 
Prior to the 1990s, the English courts emphasised the duty placed on the 
administrator to provide good administration rather than focusing on the right 
of the public to good administration.104 The concept of reasonableness in 
South African administrative law developed significantly over the years prior 
to the Constitution.105 The traditional approach was developed from the 
English judgment of Associated Provincial Houses v Wednesbury 
Corporation,106 where action that was so unreasonable that no reasonable 
authority could ever have come to the same conclusion was taken on 
review.107 This eventually became the “gross unreasonableness” test: “so 
unreasonable that no reasonable person could so have exercised the power 
or performed the function.”108 The test for unreasonableness developed 
further following the judgment in Union Government v Union Steel 
Corporation,109 which developed into the “symptomatic unreasonableness” 
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test. This test held that the administrative decision had to be so grossly 
unreasonable and to such a striking degree to warrant interference as there 
was a clearirregularity in the making of the administrative decision.110 This 
can be argued as the development of the English concept of the “gross 
unreasonableness” test in Wednesbury.111 The test further developed in the 
Chetty’s Motors112 judgment, which added the “failure to apply one’s mind” 
concept, in other words the courts would find the administrative action invalid 
when on review it found that the administrator failed to apply its mind to the 
issue in accordance with directions of statute and therefore the decision was 
grossly unreasonable to such a striking degree that it warranted the 
conclusion that there had been a failure to apply one’s mind.113 
The development of the common law principles surrounding rationality 
and the establishment of the doctrine separation of powers in South Africa, 
resulted in the autonomy of the judiciary and the administration; it was 
accepted that it is not the legitimate function of the Courts to substitute 
decisions for the administration, but that there must be a measure of control 
over rationality and basic fairness to ensure administrative justice.114 The 
jurisprudence of the pre-democratic era is flooded with different approaches 
to the ground of reasonableness, which slowly encouraged the movement 
towards finding a unified ground of reasonableness. Lawrence Baxter led this 
movement and argued strongly that unreasonableness was an independent 
ground for the invalidity of administrative action, making it subject to review 
by the courts.115 
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2.3.3 Common law duty to act fairly 
The duty for administrators to act fairly is accepted as forming part of the rule 
of law. Laws need to be certain and predictable; a person cannot be deprived 
of a substantial interest unless he is given the right to a fair hearing.116 
Fairness is not applied in exactly the same way to every situation; it demands 
that it be applied in the context of the administrative decision.117 The rules of 
natural justice have been explained as the fundamental principles of fairness 
underpinning our system of law.118 These principles are expressed in the two 
common law maxims audi alteram partem (hear the other side) and nemo 
iudex in propria causa (no one may judge in his own case). 
The audi alteram partem principle contains similar rules to those found 
in the PAJA119 namely, a notice of intended action: a citizen that is concerned 
with the administrative action must be given notice of the intended action. 
The citizen must also be given an opportunity to be heard, and although the 
courts did not demand oral hearings to be held in all cases, hearings may be 
necessary. Further the person affected has the right to be representation in 
order to rebut evidence against him, and the right to cross-examine and 
approach legal representation. Common law principles regarding public 
hearings held that unless a relevant statute requires a public hearing, it is not 
essential to natural justice.120 Audi alteram partem thus provided an 
individual the opportunity to be heard, rather than the public.121 
The requirements under nemo iudex in propria causa embrace two 
basic principles: first, the principle that the adjudicator should not have a 
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personal or pecuniary interest in the matter and secondly that there should 
be an absence of bias and partiality.122 In the matter of BTR Industries South 
Africa (PTY) Ltd and Others v Metal and Allied Workers’ Union and 
Another,123 the court put to rest whether the rule against bias is based on a 
“reasonable suspicion of bias” or whether the standard for testing bias is the 
“real likelihood of bias existing”. This matter dealt with the recusal of an 
arbitrator in a matter between the employer and the employees, who had 
also presented a one-day seminar to the employer on management’s 
perspectives on the “new labour law”.124 The court held that it was not 
necessary for there to be a “real likelihood”, only a “reasonable suspicion” of 
bias, which provided for a less demanding standard of proof; to “insist upon 
the appearance of a real likelihood of bias, would cut at the very root of the 
principle deeply embedded in our law, that justice must be seen to be 
done.”125 The essence of the principle is that no one can be fairly judged if 
the case before him has already been prejudged, for instance where a 
tribunal shuts its mind to any submission made or evidence tendered, bias 
arises. The question is always whether, objectively, the circumstances could 
have caused bias on the part of the administrator.126 
2.4 Conclusion 
It is evident that pre-1994, the courts ‘haphazardly’ considered public 
participation where administrative action affected the public as between the 
deprivation theory and the determination theory there was no real focus on 
the rights of the public at large. As has been explained, administrative law as 
we know it today developed over time and includes aspects of our 
Westminster past, such as the theories of natural justice, ultra vires, 
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lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. It is understood that it is 
in this context that the Constitutional right to lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair administration action has developed. Administrative law 
today will only deem administrative action concerning the public to be 
procedurally fair if it contains some form of public participation process. How 





CHAPTER 3 THE SCOPE OF SECTION 4 OF THE PROMOTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT 3 OF 2000 
3.1 Introduction 
What is the purpose behind section 4 of the PAJA? It is said that section 4’s 
purpose is to provide the public with an opportunity to be heard on matters of 
public concern.127 Raubenheimer128 argues that public participation is one of 
the few tools that assist the public in monitoring the exercise of public power; 
the procedures used for public participation are therefore important in 
safeguarding and ensuring that lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair 
decisions are made.129 For public participation to be effective, it requires 
three important elements: access to information, participation in decision-
making and access to justice.130 Most importantly, public participation is only 
fair and effective when the relevant authority intends to incorporate the input 
gathered from the public into decisions or development plans.131 
Section 4 of the PAJA132 promotes public involvement in decisions that 
affect the public’s life. Any administrative action that materially and adversely 
affects the rights of the public must be procedurally fair.133 The PAJA lists the 
various elements that contribute to procedurally fair administrative action: 
holding a public inquiry, following a notice and comment procedure, or 
following another appropriate procedure that gives effect to the notice and 
comment procedure.134 Section 4 of the PAJA has replaced the common law 
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position regarding administrative action that affects the public.135 These 
mechanisms of procedural fairness can be considered mechanisms of a 
collective nature, the purpose of which is to provide effective public 
participation in administrative action.136 Public participation has been 
described as a “surrogate political process” as it increases people’s 
perception of democracy. In addition, public participation assists the aim of 
the PAJA by creating a culture of accountability, openness and transparency 
in the administration.137 
3.2 Unpacking section 4 of the PAJA 
If section 4(1) of the PAJA is deconstructed, it can be concluded that only in 
cases where administrative action materially and adversely affects the rights 
of the public, will an administrator ensure that the administrative action 
complies with procedural fairness, which would include the public 
participation procedure set out in sections 4(1), (2) and (3) of the PAJA. 
Therefore, to unpack this provision, it seems necessary to define the terms 
that limit the application of section 4 of the PAJA, which include defining the 
meaning of administrative action, and further identifying when such action is 
considered to materially and adversely affect the rights of the public. In 
addition, in considering the effect of such action, it is also necessary to 
unpack the meaning behind “affecting the rights of the public”. 
 Administrative action is defined by the PAJA138 as 
“…any decision that is taken, or a failure to take a decision by an organ 
of state when exercising a power… or exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of any legislation…”139 
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Prior to the enactment of the PAJA, the courts had already begun to define 
administrative action through case law. In Fedsure Life Insurance v Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council,140 the court analysed the 
administrative action by the Municipality of Johannesburg and considered the 
issue of what constitutes administrative action. The court held that the action 
by legislative bodies in exercising their original law-making powers would not 
be considered administrative action.141 Furthermore, the court highlighted 
that although law-making does not fall within the definition of administrative 
action, legislation often enables functionaries to make certain laws. This 
process where laws are created by functionaries can therefore be classified 
as administrative action.142 In short, where a functionary develops law 
(regulations and proclamations) in terms of legislation, that action is 
considered administrative action. 
 In the South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU)143 judgment, the 
court held that administrative action is closely connected to the part of 
government that is concerned with implementing legislation. In SARFU, the 
court distinguished between the actions of Government in developing policy 
in instigating legislation, and in implementing the policy or legislation 
created.144 The court therefore developed criteria to help distinguish what 
action by the executive would be considered administrative action. The court 
therefore considers the source of power, the nature of a power and whether it 
includes an exercise of a public duty, and whether the power is closely 
related to the implementation of policy or legislation.145 It was confirmed that 
in terms of section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution, the discretionary power of the 
president to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate the affairs of 
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SARFU would not be considered administrative action. It is therefore 
important to focus on the nature of the power, rather than on the organ of 
state exercising the power.146 
 Following the various judicial decisions regarding the definition of 
administrative action, the drafters of the PAJA ensured that it excluded a 
number of actions by the state that would not be considered administrative 
action. These exclusions include the executive power of the national and 
provincial executive, the legislative functions of parliament, a provincial 
legislature or municipal council and the judicial functions of a judicial 
officer.147 This definition of administrative action is highly convoluted and 
often confusing and to add to the confusion, public participation only applies 
to administrative action that adversely affects the public and not all of 
government’s action directly affects the electorate, often it is the process or 
the implementation of the legislation that may affect the rights of the public.148 
 As explained earlier, Section 1 of the PAJA defines administrative 
action to include any decision or failure to take a decision by an organ of 
state exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or provincial constitution, 
or exercising a public power or performing a public function which adversely 
affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect, 
but does not include: 
(a) National Executive power including sections 79(1) of the Constitution –
the power of a president to ascent a bill into action; section 84(2)(a), 
(b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (k) of the Constitution – presidential 
power regarding the referring of bill’s to the National Assembly and the 
Constitutional Court, the summonsing of the National Assembly and 
National Council of Provinces, making appointments, calling a national 
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referendum, appointing a commission of enquiry, calling a national 
referendum, receiving foreign diplomats, appointing ambassadors and 
conferring honours. It does not include administrative action by the 
president involving the appointment of the deputy president (s 92(2), 
(3), (4) and (5) of the Constitution), cabinet members providing reports 
to Parliament about matters under their control (s 92(3) of the 
Constitution), appointing deputy ministers, transferring of powers of 
cabinet members, assigning cabinet members functions, national 
intervention in provincial administration (ss 93, 97, 98, 99 and 100 of 
the Constitution) 
(b) Executive power or function of the provincial executive include 
functions referred to in Constitutional section 121(1) and (2) – 
assenting bills, section 125(2)(d), (3) and (f) – the premiers’ powers to 
develop and implement provincial legislation and policy, section 126 – 
assigning functions of executive council to municipal council, section 
127(2) – the premier’s responsibility regarding bills, section 132(2) – 
the premier’s responsibility to appoint the member of her/his executive 
council, section 133(3)(b) – reports by members of executive council 
to the legislature, sections 137 and 138 – the premier’s power to 
transfer functions as well as temporarily assign functions of members 
of the executive, section 139 – provincial intervention in local 
government, and section 145(1) – the signing, safe keeping and 
publication of provincial constitutions. 
(c) The executive powers of a municipal council.  
(d) Parliament’s, a provincial legislature’s and a municipal council’s 
legislative functions. 
(e) The judicial functions of a judicial officer – section 166 of the 
Constitution, including traditional leaders’ judicial functions and the 
judicial function of Special Investigating Units. 
(f) A decision to institution or continue a prosecution. 
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(g) Any aspect of appointing a judicial officer by the Judicial Service 
Commission. 
(h) Any decision taken, or failure to take a decision in terms of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (the PAIA).149 
(i) Any decision taken or failure to take a decision in terms of section 4(1) 
of the PAJA.150 (own emphasis) 
It would appear that the PAJA’s creators purposefully excluded section 
4(1) of the PAJA in the definition of administrative action to ensure that the 
process of public participation should not be subject to scrutiny by the 
PAJA.151 This could be interpreted as the drafters’ attempt to prevent a 
burdensome process of participation. Should the decision by an administrator 
to hold a public inquiry, follow a notice and comment procedure, or follow a 
fair but different approach be subject to reasonableness or judicial review, 
the process would be inordinately inefficient.152 Therefore it is clear that the 
section 4 decisions or the process involved in section 4 is not considered 
administrative action and therefore not reviewable. However, this process 
remains subject to the common law principles of legality and the provisions of 
the Constitution.153 
 Some confusion remains with regard to the implementation of 
legislation and the formation of policy over whether it is considered 
administrative action. The court in Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Education and Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ed-U-College,154 considered the 
issue of policy formulation resulting from a legislative obligation and held that 
where an executive determines a policy but does so outside a legislative 
framework, the executive’s action would not be administrative in nature, as it 
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involves a political decision. On the other hand, where an executive is 
implementing legislation and by doing so creates policy, this action would be 
administrative in nature.155 
 Through case law, and the definitions of administrative action 
contained in the PAJA, it is clear what is and is not considered administrative 
action. In saying this, it is equally important to assess the meaning of 
administrative action “materially and adversely” affecting the rights of the 
public. Govender explains that the nature of this requirement focuses on the 
effect of the action rather than on the nature of the action.156 It would seem 
almost limiting that administrative action must materially and adversely affect 
the rights of the public before section 4 of the PAJA is applicable. What adds 
to the questions behind this “proviso” that limits the application of a public 
participatory process to all administrative action affecting the public, is that 
there is no such “limitation” contained in the section 33 constitutional right, 
which provides a right to all citizens to lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair administrative action.157 
 The meaning of “rights” in section 4 of the PAJA applies to all pre-
existing rights, and includes contractual, delictual, property rights and 
constitutional rights.158 The interpretation relating to “rights that have been 
affected”, has been further extended to the procedural fairness of tender 
processes. Although a person contracting with government does not have the 
right to the contract, the right to have the application considered in a 
procedurally fair manner does exist.159 
 From the definition of administrative action as per section 1 of the 
PAJA, and further bearing in mind that section 4 applies only to action that 
materially and adversely affects the rights of the public; it is clear that PAJA 
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centres on the notion of deprivation rather than on determination, and 
therefore, those without an existing right are excluded from the protection of 
the PAJA.160 It is argued, however, that restrictions placed on what is 
considered administrative action and whether the action affects the public’s 
rights materially and adversely are necessary to prevent the administration 
from being overburdened by the requirements set out in section 4, which may 
lead to inefficiency in government.161 In order to encourage efficiency in 
government, judges should develop a theory of deference when applying the 
PAJA. Theorists believe the courts must achieve a balance between 
intervening and not intervening in government decisions.162 The focus on the 
requirement that a right must be affected is premised on the insistence that it 
must be of “direct and external legal effect” on all pre-existing rights.163 In this 
regard, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) matter of Transnet Ltd v 
Goodman Brother (Pty) Ltd164 is applicable. In this matter, Transnet failed to 
award a tender to the Goodman Brothers. The Goodman Brothers argued 
that this was administrative action, however Transnet was of the opinion that 
the Goodman Brothers did not have an existing right, and therefore the 
requirement that administrative action must “affect a right” was not fulfilled, 
and the PAJA was not applicable. However, the Goodman Brothers as 
tenderers had a right to lawful and procedurally fair administrative action in 
terms of the adjudication of their bid.165 It is clear that the concept of rights 
has extended somewhat, and rights in the context of administrative action 
may be broader than the definition of “rights” in private law166. This was 
evident in the matter of Dilokong Chrome Mines v Direkteur-General, 
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Department van Handel en Nywerheid,167 where the publishing of an export 
incentive scheme in the government gazette, enabled a right that was 
applicable to all those who would participate in the schemes.168 
3.3 The difference between administrative action affecting the person 
and administrative action affecting the public 
The PAJA created two separate and unrelated procedural fairness regimes. 
The first applies to administrative action affecting any person; the second 
applies solely to administrative action that has a broad effect.169 Where an 
individual is involved, procedural fairness entails a number of general 
requirements, which inter alia include notice of the intended action, an 
opportunity to make representations prior to the decision being taken, and a 
clear statement of the administrative action; these aspects of procedurally fair 
administrative action affecting the person are embodied in section 3 of the 
PAJA.170 Section 4 of the PAJA is quite different from section 3’s general 
requirements for procedurally fair administrative action; section 4 contains 
specific requirements aimed at public participation.171 The need for section 4 
to be a free standing provision indicates that the drafters of the PAJA 
intended that the administrative actions targeted in section 3 and 4 fall into 
entirely separate categories.172 It was explained in chapter 2 of this paper 
that pre-1994, administrative decisions affecting a large number of people 
were categorised as legislative actions and therefore exempted from the audi 
alteram partem principle of natural justice. 
As was also explained in chapter 2, the tide relating to the applicability 
of the principles of natural justice turned following the South African Board v 
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Johannesburg City Council,173 where the court dismissed the criteria set in 
the Pretoria City Council174 judgment but did not abandon the general 
concept of distinguishing administrative action affecting the individual from 
that which affects the public.175 Section 4 contains comprehensive directives 
to ensure procedural fairness; these directives include the holding of a public 
inquiry, following a notice and comment procedure, or adopting a 
combination of the two.176 
There is also a significant difference between the wording of section 3 
and section 4 of the PAJA. Section 4 of the PAJA is narrow and only applies 
to “rights affecting the public”, whereas section 3 applies to “rights or 
legitimate expectations of any person.”177 Section 4 of the PAJA contains the 
minimum rules and procedures to be followed to attain procedurally fair 
administrative action affecting the public. It is possible that in drafting 
section 4, the PAJA drafters understood the background to the public’s right 
to be heard and the courts’ fear178 that natural justice may be overextended, 
and so created specific procedures instead of the more wide ranging 
procedures in section 3. The procedures set out in section 4(1)–(3) do not 
concern holding individual hearings for each person; rather it has been 
drafted to focus on large numbers of people for which the procedure set out 
in section 3 would be too laborious and inefficient.179 
This distinction between section 3 and section 4, however, poses an 
interpretation problem. Although it has been argued that section 3 contains 
general procedures to be followed to obtain procedurally fair administrative 
action, the application of section 3 is far from general. The administrative 
action in terms of this section applies to particular instances that affect the 
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private individual. Section 4 applies broadly to the general public; its 
application is general although the requirements it sets out are specific.180 
The problem is that “any person” and the “the public” are phrases that are not 
independent of each other, since the public comprises a number of people.181 
Some argue that a particular administrative decision affecting the general 
public often has a special effect on individuals or vice-versa.182 An example 
of this would be the case of Earthlife Africa v Director-General: Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism,183 where it was held that the decision by 
the department to erect a pebble-bed nuclear reactor affected the rights of 
individual persons and the public in general, and thus could require the 
application of both section 3 and section 4 procedures.184 
The effect of separating section 3 and section 4 is that in every instance 
of administrative action an assessment must be made to distinguish whether 
the act affects the public or whether it affects the person, especially as 
different procedures are used for the two separate categories.185 It has been 
suggested that the following questions should be asked when considering 
whether the administrative action materially affects the public: Has the 
administrative action had a general impact? Has the general impact had a 
significant public effect? Have the constitutional, statutory or common-law 
rights of a member of the public been an issue?186 The PAJA defines the 
public for the purposes of section 4 as “any group or class of the public.”187 
An example of this is the legislation that allows the Minister of Education to 
formulate national policy regarding the admission of students to schools. 
                                            
 
180Currie and Klaaren op cit (n169) at 110. 
181Mass op cit (n136) at 67. 
182DJ Brynard Procedural fairness to the public as an instrument to enhance public 
participation in public administration Administratio Publica Vol 19 No 4 (2011) at 102. 
183Earth life Africa (Cape Town) v Director-General: Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, 2005 (3) SA 156 (C). 
184Supra at para 72. 
185Currie and Klaaren op cit (n169) at 114. 
186Ibid at 114. 
187Section 1 (xi) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
35 
 
Should the minister determine the age of admission to all schools in a policy, 
this ministerial decision will generally affect the rights of those members of 
the public that have children in the process of being admitted to school.188 
This illustrates that the term “public” implies that the effect of the 
administrative action must be purely general in nature, meaning that the 
administrator has not defined any individually affected persons.189 It therefore 
seems that the objective of section 4 of the PAJA is to balance the right to 
fair administrative action against the need to promote efficient administrative 
action. In short, although this right would be “best served” if everyone that 
affected by an action could be notified personally, practically this is 
impossible.190  
3.4 Types of public participation 
It is said that the political theory of civic republicanism best describes public 
participation.191 Public participation involves the promotion of discussion 
among citizens to attain the best possible outcome for all participating. Public 
participation does not involve negotiating an agreement among interest 
groups, but allows all citizens to partake as equals to reach a decision for the 
greater good of society.192 The importance of public participation lies in the 
theory that governmental decisions have a far greater chance of being 
accepted by society where public participation is involved as citizens are 
more informed and educated, and administrators are held accountable for the 
decisions.193 
The PAJA does not set out the criteria that an administrator should 
follow to select the form of public participation, which means the 
administrator has a free choice in which public participation procedure set out 
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in section 4 of the PAJA to choose.194 The administrator may choose from 
the two options: to hold a public inquiry or to follow a notice and comment 
procedure. The administrator is further entitled to follow a combination of 
both these procedures. The administrator may also follow a fair but different 
approach, or follow another appropriate procedure. An administrator’s choice 
of procedure is informed by factors such as the effect the decision may have 
on the geographical area, i.e. whether the administrative decision affects 
people locally or nationally. The administrator has to consider the cost of the 
public participation and the efficiency required in making the decision.195 In 
most circumstances, an administrator would opt to hold a public inquiry or 
follow a notice and comment procedure where large numbers of people are 
concerned.196 
The nature and scope of each procedure is different. A public inquiry 
process involves the public providing verbal testimony at a specific time and 
in a specific place.197 There are three stages of a public inquiry: the pre-
inquiry stage (also known as the preliminary stage), the inquiry stage and the 
post-inquiry stage.198 The first stage involves preparation by the administrator 
who must appoint a suitable panel to preside over the public participation 
process and give proper notice of the hearing.199 The pre-inquiry stage is 
detailed in the regulations to the PAJA, and sets out requirements such as 
the language of the notice, the form of publication of the notice, and the 
requirement to obtain special assistance for members of the public who are 
unable to read or write.200 Regulations 11 to 16201 of the PAJA regulations 
regulate the conduct at public hearings. The post-inquiry stage requires the 
holder of the inquiry to compile a written report and to publish the report in 
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the Government Gazette or any relevant Provincial Gazette, and in a 
newspaper both in English and in at least one other official language.202 
These regulations set the minimum standard for procedural fairness to 
ensure that the enquiry is brought to the public’s attention and to provide for 
the use of press conferences, electronic media, posters and leaflets to 
achieve adequate notification. Instead of reducing the obligations placed on 
authorities, the focus is rather on maximising the efforts to attract the 
attention of those affected by the proposed administrative action.203 
A notice and comment procedure in terms of section 4(3) of the PAJA 
consists of four stages: taking the appropriate steps to communicate the 
action, calling for comments, consideration of the comments received and 
deciding whether or not to proceed with the administrative action.204 This 
procedure is often the quicker, and more effective and cost efficient 
procedure.205 Proper notification, however, must be achieved both 
procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, the administrator must be able 
to confirm that notice has been given to people who are affected and 
therefore that these people have been informed.206 Substantively, the notice 
must contain sufficient detail to enable the public to make meaningful 
representations.207  
This, however, poses a potential problem as often it is the private sector 
that possesses the necessary expertise and information that may be 
beneficial in making the administrative decision. For parties in the private 
sector, the best type of notice is detailed, specific and inclusive of the 
necessary data. Other affected parties, however, may not be as 
knowledgeable and so much detail may obscure the general points of the 
proposed administrative action. A compromise reached by administrators is 
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to keep the notice brief but to attach a more detailed appendix to the notice 
with the “sophisticated information”.208 The problem with this approach 
though is the paucity of information on the notice itself; some applicants 
could dismiss the notice on the basis of lack of information and not consider 
the appendix at all.209 
When an administrator proceeds with a notice and comment procedure, 
there must a genuine and appropriate application of the mind to the 
representations made by the public.210 The notice and comment procedure 
must consider the issues presented by the community, as if it does not, the 
process lacks any benefit.211 
Section 4 is essential for regulating the process of decision-making, and 
a failure to comply would render the decision invalid. Further, any legislative 
decision or rule giving effect to such a decision would be set aside if the 
process used to formulate the decision was not according to the 
requirements of section 4.212 As grave consequences are applicable for not 
complying with section 4, should an administrator depart from the 
requirements, the administrator must justify that departure by demonstrating 
that a conscious decision was taken to depart from the section 4 
procedure.213 
3.5 The application of section 4 of the PAJA in South African 
jurisprudence 
The paper thus far has unpacked the history of public participation in South 
Africa and considered the path towards a more representative democracy. 
However, in order to fully understand public participation, it is important to 
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understand the application of section 4 by the courts. How does the judiciary 
apply section 4 of the PAJA?  
In the 2006 judgment in Chairperson’s Association v Minister of Arts and 
Culture,214 the court considered the controversial decision by the Minister of 
Arts and Culture to change the name of the town Louis Trichardt to Makhado. 
Counsel for the minister argued that section 10(1) of the South African 
Geographical Names Council Act 118 of 1998 was silent on the question of 
public consultation. Section 10(1) provided that “the minister may approve or 
reject a geographical name recommended by the Council in terms of section 
9(1)(d) of the Geographical Names Council Act.” The court held that although 
the act was silent on the question of consultation, the subject matter was of a 
sensitive nature, and thus that a decision without considering the relevant 
consultation would be problematic.215 The minister held that in terms of 
section 4(1) of the PAJA, where administrative action adversely affects the 
rights of the public, an administrator must give effect to procedurally fair 
administrative action and must decide amongst other things whether it 
wishes to hold a public inquiry or follow a notice and comment procedure, or 
to follow a procedure empowered by an enabling provision.216 
 Although counsel for the minister argued that the Geographical Names 
Council was a body constituted of councillors elected by the people, thus 
representing the people, and therefore that consultation was not needed, the 
court held that the necessary consultation had taken place. What is 
surprising is that the court accepted that the minister had complied with the 
consultation requirement on account of his answering affidavit stating that he 
had considered objections to the proposed name change, and that the 
objections emanated from a “minority group that failed to exert their influence 
during the democratic process.” The minister further stated that he had 
considered the objections very carefully, but had been unpersuaded that the 
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will of the majority should be denied.217 Section 10(3) of the Geographical 
Names Council Act provides as follows: 
“Any person or body dissatisfied with a geographical name approved by 
the Minister may, within one month from the date of publication of the 
geographical name in the Gazette, lodge a complaint in writing to the 
Minister.” 
As an administrator is permitted to follow a procedure empowered by any 
empowering provision that is fair but different, it would appear that the court 
held that section 10(3) of the Geographical Names Council Act provided 
some sort of participation procedure.218 
 In the fairly recent SCA matter involving the Scalabrini Centre in Cape 
Town,219 the Department of Home Affairs closed the Refugee Reception 
Office in Cape Town following a policy decision to move all refugee offices 
closer to the borders. The Scalabrini Centre, a non-profit organisation 
assisting migrant communities and a number of other parties, objected to the 
office closure based on the premise that director-general’s action constituted 
administrative action and was procedurally unfair, as prior to making 
decision, the Department had not given interested and affected parties the 
right to be heard.  
 The High Court held that the department’s decision was indeed 
administrative action and that there was no rational connection between the 
purpose of the provision and the manner in which it was taken.220 However, 
the SCA held that decisions heavily influenced by policy generally belonged 
in the domain of the executive.221 The SCA found that the department’s 
action did not constitute administrative action and held that the decision 
makers did not possess a general duty to consult organisations or individuals 
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having an interest in such decisions, but held rather that a duty would only 
arise in circumstances where it would be irrational to take the decision 
without such consultation because the person or organisation had special 
knowledge that would assist in the decision-making and that the decision 
maker was aware of this.222 Although “the very nature of representative 
government is that matters of government policy are properly to be ventilated 
in the appropriate representative forums,” the court held that the submission 
that those who exercise public power have a general obligation to afford a 
hearing to interested parties is a broad submission and “went too far.”223 
 In the dissenting judgment, Willis JA held that the department’s action 
was administrative action. In interpreting section 4(1) of PAJA, however, 
Willis JA held that there was no an inherent “right” on the part of the public, 
as envisaged by section 4(1) of the PAJA, to have the Refugee Reception 
Office specifically in Cape Town or in any other particular place.224 In Willis 
JA’s opinion and quoting from a Roman comic playwright, he states that: 
“There are many opinions as there are people...each have [their] own 
correct way...opinions among reasonable men and women may differ. 
That is why we have politics. That is why, when it comes to political 
matters in a constitutional state such as ours, the courts will, as a 
general rule, hold their swords behind their backs. Ordinarily, moreover, 
the courts will, in such matters, hold the sword in their left hands and 
their shields in the right: the courts hold up the shield in preference to 
the sword when it comes to political matters of policy.”225 
In short, Willis JA deemed the action by the department as 
administrative, but concluded that there had been no “right” that had been 
adversely affected. 
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Another recent judgment dealing with administrative action affecting the 
public was the matter concerning the most recent upgrade of roads in 
Gauteng province by the infamous South African National Roads Agency 
Limited (SANRAL) in terms of the National Roads Act 7 of 1998.226 In this 
matter the applicants, the Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance (OUTA), a 
voluntary association opposed to e-tolling as a means to fund construction of 
road improvements, sought an interdict against the Minister of Transport and 
SANRAL to prevent SANRAL from levying and collecting tolls on certain 
sections of the Gauteng freeways using an electronic tolling system known 
as e-tolls.  
The applicants relied on section 6 of the PAJA contending that the 
decision lacked rationality; they also relied on a number of other grounds for 
review,227 one of which was that SANRAL had failed to allow for public 
participation in terms of section 4(1) of the PAJA, as the administrative action 
materially and adversely affected the rights of the public.228 The High Court 
held in favour of OUTA and granted an interim interdict restraining SANRAL 
from proceeding with e-tolls.229 SANRAL, the National Treasury and the 
Gauteng Department of Roads and Transport appealed to the Constitutional 
Court against the High Court’s decision. The Constitutional Court considered 
the separation of powers doctrine and Moseneke DCJ held that before 
granting interdictory relief pending a review, a court must in absence of any 
mala fides examine carefully whether its order will intrude on the territory of 
another arm of Government in a manner inconsistent with separation of 
powers.230 The Constitutional Court criticised the High Court for its 
“deafening silence on the over-arching consideration of the separation of 
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powers doctrine”.231 By applying the principles in the Doctors for Life232 and 
International Trade Administration233, the court warned against usurping the 
power or function of administrators who have been entrusted powers by valid 
legislation and that the balance of power implied by the separation of powers 
should not be frustrated.234  
3.6 Why public participation? 
Clearly there is a fine line when challenging government actions and the 
courts are careful not to cross that line and encroach on the separation of 
powers doctrine. If this is the case then why is public participation important 
considering that the demand for public participation places such an 
exhaustive burden on government? A short answer would be that public 
participation is an important element of democracy. When a government is 
responsive to the people’s needs it is said to be democratic.235 Pluralists 
consider politics as a struggle among interest groups for the minimal social 
resources available to citizens and that law is a “commodity” subject to the 
effects of supply and demand.236 The various interest groups within society 
compete for majority support, and once they have enough support they put 
political representatives under pressure to respond to their needs.237 Under 
the pluralist theory, law is created by the decision-makers taking into account 
the opinions of the majority interest group within society. A direct response to 
pluralism is “civic republicanism”, which totally rejects the pluralist idea. Civic 
republicans believe that decision makers do not get involved in the lobbying 
process, but rather seek new information and different perspectives before 
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making decisions. Civic republicanism considers basic principles, namely: 
deliberation, equality of all involved, universalism and citizenship.238 
Accountability is the basic constitutional value and principle of 
democracy in the governing of public administration.239 Accountability in 
government promotes justification by administrators. Administrators have to 
justify to citizens the reasoning behind any decisions taken, and it is for this 
reason that administrative decisions must be reasonable, lawful and 
procedurally fair.240 By justifying administrative action in terms of a fair 
procedure, the value of accountability is served in a direct way.241 Public 
participation improves the quality of administrative action, which is an 
outcome of the procedure whereby the administrator is able to make its 
decision based on all the relevant information and points of view it has 
gathered.242 Procedurally fair administrative decisions promote legitimate 
decision-making and reduce arbitrary decisions made by government.243 
Section 4 of the PAJA enables procedurally fair administrative action, which 
in turn enhances the constitutional principles of “openness, accountability 
and participation.”244 There is truth in the theory that an individual will accept 
a negative administrative decision where the procedure in arriving at that 
decision was procedurally fair; a procedurally fair administrative action 
affecting the general public must therefore promote participation as it 
generates loyalty, cooperation and affirms equal worth to all affected 
persons.245 
In short, public participation in administrative and legislative decision-
making is important for a number of reasons: it leads to informed decision 
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making; it inspires public confidence in government; and through its process 
in reaching decisions that affect citizens, it encourages transparency and 
participation by the public. People in turn own the decision-making process 
on account of their involvement. Lastly, participation is considered a 
proactive rather than a reactive form of eradicating detrimental administrative 
conduct.246  
3.7 Conclusion 
There has been considerable development in the approach to participation in 
administrative decisions. Even though South Africa has come a long way 
from the determination and deprivation theory of the past, the “right” to public 
participation is not an exclusive right. Limitations to public participation are 
necessary to avoid over burdening the executive. The various limitations 
regarding section 4 include the definition of administrative action and the fact 
that there must be a right that has been materially and adversely affected. It 
is clear that the courts use these limitations and are careful not to intrude on 
other branches of government.  
It is understood that public participation is an important aspect of 
democracy, but at what cost? Does public participation hinder the efficiency 
of government or do the limitations embedded in the PAJA encourage and 
promote efficiency? Are administrators compelled to follow the procedures of 
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CHAPTER 4 A REASONABLE, JUSTIFIABLE DEPARTURE FROM THE 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENT  
4.1 Introduction 
In terms of section 4(4)(a) of the PAJA, an administrator has the discretion to 
depart from the public participation procedure set out in section 4(1)(a) to (e), 
(2) and (3) of the PAJA if there are reasonable and justifiable circumstances 
to permit such a departure. Section 4(4)(b) of the PAJA lists the relevant 
factors that an administrator should consider when determining whether the 
departure from the requirements of procedurally fair administrative action 
affecting the public, is reasonable and justifiable. Section 4(4)(b) of the PAJA 
stipulates that an administrator should take into account all relevant factors 
including:  
(a) The objects of the empowering provision; 
(b) The nature, purpose and need to take the administrative action; 
(c) The urgency of the matter or the taking of the administrative action;  
(d) The need to promote an efficient administrative action and good 
governance.  
In the matter of Matiso v The Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth 
Prison,247 Froneman J held that the rules that apply to the interpretation of 
legislation, particularly “the intention of the legislature”, do not apply in a 
system of judicial review that is based on the Constitution being the supreme 
law of the land. In short, the Constitution is sovereign and not the legislature, 
and therefore legislation must be tested against the values and principles 
imposed by the Constitution.248 This implies that when interpreting the PAJA, 
and in particular section 4(4)(a) and (b) of the PAJA for the purposes outlined 
in this paper, the interpretation must give effect to the values and principles 
                                            
 




imposed by the Constitution, and further, the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights must be realised.249 This is important when interpreting whether 
a departure from the section 4(1)(a)–(e), (2) and (3) is reasonable and 
justifiable.  
4.2 What constitutes reasonable and justifiable in the context of 
section 4(4) of the PAJA? 
South Africa will attain a culture of justification through the proper application 
of the Bill of Rights.250 A democratic government is a responsive government. 
A responsive government promotes participation and accountability and an 
accountable government is able to justify its decisions to those it governs.251 
This is the context that the drafters of the PAJA had in mind when stipulating 
that any departure from section 4 of the PAJA must be justifiable and 
reasonable in the circumstances. The word “justifiable” suggests that a sound 
process went into making the decision, it does not suggest a “second 
guessing” of important policy choices252 
Etienne Mureinik considers three questions a decision maker must 
consider when establishing a justifiable decision. An administrative decision 
cannot be regarded as justifiable unless the administrator has considered all 
the serious objections to the decision and contemplates credible answers in 
response to the objections.253 Further, a decision-maker must consider all 
serious alternatives to the decision and discard any implausible ones, and 
finally, a decision-maker must establish a rational connection between the 
premises and the conclusion, between the information it has and the decision 
taken.254 All in all Mureinik states that a decision maker must be conscious 
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that a court may eventually scrutinise its decision under the criteria outlined 
above.255 
South Africa’s Interim Constitution contained the right to administrative 
action that is justifiable in relation to the reasons provided by an administrator 
with regard to its decisions or action that had an effect on or threatened an 
individual’s rights.256 It is clear that the original drafters of the constitution 
completely avoided the word “reasonableness”, although there was much 
support for the interpretation of the word “justifiable” as a synonym for 
“reasonableness”.257 It can be argued, therefore, that in order to depart from 
the requirements of procedurally fair administrative action that affects the 
public, the departure should embody the principles of reasonableness, which 
in turn embody various elements but have no single meaning. Reasonable 
administrative action in terms of section 33(1) of the Constitution promised 
two elements: “rationality” and “proportionality”.258 
Rationality considers the principle that all decisions made by an 
administrator must be supported by evidence and information, and when 
assessing an administrator’s action, the court will assess whether a 
reasonable person could have arrived at the same conclusion.  
Proportionality encourages a public authority to consider the need for 
the action and the possibility that a less drastic means may accomplish the 
end.259 Therefore when a public authority acts proportionally, it will consider 
suitability, balance and necessity in conducting its administrative decision.260 
Reasonableness is a concept that “begins with rationality, as a minimum 
threshold, moves on to proportionality and ends with a value judgment on 
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what the best approach would be”.261 As it is in this context that an 
administrator wishing to depart from the public engagement process under 
section 4 of the PAJA should consider the four factors set out in section 4(b), 
it can be inferred that these factors draw on the elements and requirements 
of reasonableness and justifiability. It simplifies the role of the administrator in 
situations where there is a dire need to depart from the requirements of 
section 4, especially situations that require swift, effective and efficient 
administrative action. Such was the case in the matter of Kyalami Ridge 
Environmental Association,262 where the Minister of Public Works selected an 
area near Leeuwkop to house temporarily flood victims from Alexandra 
Township in Johannesburg.  
The government in erecting temporary houses did not consult the 
neighbouring community; the community argued that they had had a right to 
be heard prior to the administrative decision being taken as it directly and 
adversely affected their environmental rights and the right to just 
administrative action.263 The Kyalami residents contended that government 
had no powers conferred on it by legislation to grant relief to the Alexandra 
flood victims and further that it had failed to comply with the provisions of the 
Township Ordinance 15 of 1986, NEMA264 and the Environmental 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989.265  
All parties involved in the matter agreed that the Alexandra flood victims 
had a constitutional right to be provided with access to housing. All parties 
further agreed that section 26(2) of the Constitution requires government to 
take “reasonable legislative and other measures” within its available 
resources to achieve the right to access to housing; however the Kyalami 
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residents argued that in this case, government had not acted within the 
framework that catered for disaster management.266 
The court held that although the residents may have various forms of 
rights derived from legislation, those rights remained intact and had not been 
affected by government’s decision to relocate the Alexandra flood victims 
onto the property, and further that government did not dispute that it was 
obligated to establish the transit camp within the provisions of the applicable 
legislation.267 
Chaskalson P held that the Kyalami residents’ interest in terms of their 
property values being diminished by government developing low-cost 
housing to house the Alexandra Township flood victims was not a sufficient 
argument to support their claim that their rights had been affected.268 The 
court had to reconcile two conflicting interests (the rights of the Kyalami 
residents and those of the Alexandra flood victims); procedural fairness 
depends on the facts of each case and the balance of various relevant 
factors.269 The court held that there was no legal impediment to government 
establishing a transit camp on its own ground at Leeuwkop and that 
“procedural fairness does not require the government to do more that in the 
circumstances of this case than it had undertaken to do.”270 Government had 
to discharge its duty to provide everyone with access to housing; the fact that 
property values may be affected by a low-cost housing development was a 
factor that had to be considered, but the court held that this factor could not 
stand in the way of the needs of homeless people and the urgency that 
government had to address the plight of the flood victims.271 The court held 
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that the absence of consultation did not invalidate government’s decision and 
therefore upheld the appeal.272 
The matter of Minister of Home Affairs v Eisenberg and Others,273 dealt 
with immigration regulations promulgated under the Immigration Act 13 of 
2002. The applicant, the Minister of Home Affairs, appealed to the 
Constitutional Court against a High Court decision that declared the 
regulations promulgated by the minister to be invalid. In the court a quo the 
respondents had challenged the minister’s regulations on the grounds that 
the minister had not complied with the public notice and comment procedure 
prescribed in the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, and further that this was in 
conflict with section 4 of the PAJA.274 The respondents argued that in terms 
of section 33 of the Constitution and the PAJA, administrative action should 
be consistent with a “culture of accountability, openness and 
transparency.”275 The respondents relied on section 4 of the PAJA in that the 
minister’s administrative action affected the public. The Constitutional Court 
held that it was doubtful that the PAJA applied to the promulgation of 
regulations but that it was unnecessary to decide whether the PAJA was 
applicable, as in any event the PAJA provided special procedures for 
administrative action which materially and adversely affected the rights of the 
public, and these procedures need not be followed if a departure from those 
special procedures was justified in the circumstances.276 In terms of this 
matter, there had been insufficient time to follow the special procedure 
prescribed by the PAJA, and as section 4(4) of the PAJA authorises a 
departure from section 4(1) procedures if reasonable and justifiable in the 
circumstances; the court therefore held that the High Court had erred.277 The 
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Immigration Act would be unworkable without the regulations and the old 
regulations could not fill the void; if section 4(1) was applicable to the 
promulgation of regulations, it was reasonable and justifiable for the minister 
to depart from the notice and comment provisions in section 4 of the PAJA. 
4.1  General and specific departures from the obligations of section 4 
Section 4(4) of PAJA provides for a general departure from the entire section 
dealing with administrative action affecting the public. However, some argue 
that section 4(4)(a) cannot be interpreted to include a departure from section 
4(1) – the section stipulating that an administrator must decide on a particular 
procedure to give effect to procedurally fair administrative action.278 The 
reasoning behind this argument is that section 4(4)(a) states:  
“If it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, an administrator 
may depart from the requirements referred to in subsections 1(a) to (e) , 
(2) and (3)” (own emphasis).  
The drafters of the PAJA specifically mention subsection (1)(a)–(e) and not 
merely “section 4(1)”. If the drafters had intended to include section 4(1) they 
would not have specifically included “subsections (a)–(e)”. In other words, 
theorists argue that the section 4(4)(a) “departure clause” does not allow for 
departure from the decision that administrators must take to give effect to 
procedural fairness. Section 4(4)(a) of the PAJA is interpreted to permit 
departure from those specific procedures laid down by the PAJA.279  
Besides this departure, the drafters of the PAJA included other 
“departure” or “escape” clauses. These include section 4(1)(d) – the exercise 
of a fair but different procedure; section 4(1)(e) – follow another procedure 
that gives effect to procedural fairness; section 2(1)(a) of PAJA – where the 
minister responsible for administrative justice can exercise his power and 
exempt any administrative action or group or class of administrative action 
from the provisions of section 4 of the PAJA, and similarly section 2(1)(b) of 
                                            
 




PAJA whereby the minister may permit an administrator to vary any of the 
requirements set out in section 4(1)–(3) of the PAJA. These “escape/ 
departure” clauses within the PAJA have caused some theorists to question 
why the legislature deemed it necessary to include section 4(4) of the PAJA, 
“particularly in light of the fact that any decision or failure to take a decision in 
terms of section 4(1) is not reviewable.”280 
4.3  Conclusion 
The reassurance that administrators have is that where reasonable and 
justifiable in the circumstances, an administrator may depart from holding a 
public inquiry, proceeding with a notice and comment procedure, following a 
fair but different procedure or following another appropriate procedure.  
This chapter has shown that any departure will be interpreted in accordance 
with the principles of the Constitution. There must be a rational explanation 
as to why the administrator departed from the procedures, and this departure 
must be proportional to what the relevant act entailed. The PAJA drafters did 
not forget to include that the need to promote an efficient administration and 
good governance is a relevant factor to be considered when departing from a 
public participation process.  
Did the PAJA drafters foresee that the extensive obligations of the public 
participation process may hinder government’s efficiency? The next chapter 
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CHAPTER 5 AN EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION AND GOOD 
GOVERNANCE 
5.1 Introduction 
It is said that the provision to “promote an efficient administration” was added 
to the list of rights under section 33 of the Constitution281 at the very last 
moment;282 even if true, a just administration constitutes an efficient 
administration and the two concepts must be compatible with each other.283 
The right to an efficient administration prevents the judiciary from turning 
judicial review into appeal, it curtails the judiciary from being “trigger happy” 
with the judicial review gun and it limits the continuous involvement of the 
judiciary in executive affairs.284 At the same time, the need for an efficient 
administration could encourage public bodies to ignore procedural 
requirements to avoid prolonged administrative decision-making.285 There is 
therefore a “tension” between participation and the expertise of government: 
participation and transparency promote democratic legitimacy on the one 
hand, while the expertise of those making the decision implies that the 
administrative decision-making process is impartial, rational and efficient.286 
Judicial review of administrative action challenges the tension between the 
public’s right to participation and government’s expertise in making the 
decisions that affect the public.287 
An important aspect of the concept of an efficient administration is the 
principle of separation of powers. The principle of separation of powers rests 
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on various concerns and in this regard, Anashari Pillay288 lists three important 
considerations that should be highlighted when considering judicial review for 
administrative action. Pillay states that one should be mindful that the 
judiciary does not have the mandate of the electorate to pronounce on 
certain issues; secondly, the courts do not have the capacity to continuously 
second guess the actions of the executive, and thirdly, by extending the 
ambit of judicial review, Government action will be slowed down.289 
The PAJA was enacted to give practical effect to the rights contained in 
section 33 of the Constitution. Section 33(3)(c) provides that national 
legislation must be created to promote an efficient administration; thus the 
purpose of the PAJA is to promote an efficient administration and good 
governance, and to create a culture of accountability, openness and 
transparency in the public administration.290 The application of section 4 of 
the PAJA has been discussed, but the practical aspect of attempts by 
government to achieve procedurally fair administrative action may have an 
effect on the efficiency of the administration. This chapter considers the 
theory behind efficiency and good governance and whether public 
participation hinders good governance. 
5.2 An efficient administration, good governance and the courts’ 
deference 
Catherine O’Regan in her 1993 journal article “Rules for Rule-making: 
Administrative law and Subordinate Legislation”291 establishes three important 
normative requirements that would guide the development of administrative 
law.  Drawing on the failures in terms of the un-democratic South Africa’s 
administrative law, O’ Regan views efficiency, fairness, and accountability as 
important. An efficient administration will consider the time, costs and success 
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of policy implementation, however most autocratic governments (much like the 
Apartheid government) would claim that their government is efficient; however 
this efficiency often goes hand in hand with illegitimacy and oppression. 
Efficiency must be both fair and acceptable, and O’Regan points out that this is 
particularly necessary in South Africa with regard to the scarcity of 
resources.292 Fairness is essential for a functional administration, more so in 
South Africa considering that not everyone in the apartheid government was 
equal before the law. Fairness will ensure that certain individuals or groups are 
not oppressed. The third important standard that administrative law should 
embody is accountability. O’Regan expresses that this should not be a narrow 
form of accountability, i.e. a responsive government, but rather accountability 
in its broad sense, where administrators make their decision acceptable to the 
people, which requires that the decisions should be rational and  properly 
informed (through a consultation or participation process).293 
Society perceives the right to procedural fairness as a mechanism that 
imposes a duty on public officials to achieve and uphold a fair, honest, 
transparent and accountable public administration. This administration serves 
the general interest of the common good and not the interest of the 
administrator taking the decision.294 The practical aspect of this duty 
demands that a public official remain accountable for any decision taken, and 
that the exercise of action is not for its benefit but for that of the public.295 
This is why the nature of accountability of government works hand in hand 
with the concept of justification and of public participation. Through consulting 
with the public, government is able to account for its decisions, which in turn 
enable it to justify its decisions contrary the public’s rights. Within the context 
of a culture of justification, an administrator may be required to justify a 
decision on request, and therefore the duty of accountability imposed on an 
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administrator promotes a responsive government and helps determine the 
needs of the public.296 The duty that procedural fairness imposes on an 
administrator also facilitates the gathering of information to assists in 
ensuring administrative accountability.297 
Backed by democratic constitution, South Africa’s administrative law 
has instilled the democratic principles of accountability and participation.298 
Section 32 (the right to access to information), 33 (the right to lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action) and 34 (the right to 
access to courts and tribunals) of the Constitution achieve these principles. 
However, democracy goes further than the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights; in fact, the Constitution sets out nine guiding values in section 195(1), 
the idea being that the peoples’ needs must be responded to.299 Section 195 
of the Constitution sets out the basic values and principles that govern the 
public administration as the courts cannot be expected to single-handedly 
regulate the exercise of public power effectively. The Breakwater Declaration 
of 1993300 suggested that a range of procedures and institutions be 
developed to ensure good governance.301 Procedures that would ensure 
good governance include access to official information, genuinely 
participatory rule-making and decision-making procedures, and a duty on 
administrators to provide reasons for decisions made.302 These concepts of 
good governance assisted the South African government in moving away 
from its history of a culture of authority and parliamentary sovereignty to a 
culture of justification and accountability. 
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In terms of the Constitution, specifically section 195(1)(b), efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy are the basic underlying values in public 
administration.303 However, it has been suggested that this creates a green 
light for public officials to make administrative decisions that do not 
incorporate procedural fairness.304 Some administrators may regard 
procedural fairness as a restriction created by the law to hinder efficiency and 
effectiveness.305 However, where an administrator makes a decision that is 
without bias and with due consideration of the views of the public, it is argued 
that the decision will not only be acceptable but will also be of better 
quality.306 Others argue that procedures promoting procedurally fair 
administrative action reconcile the conflicting interests of the various 
individuals on the one hand and promote government’s interest in an efficient 
and effective public administration on the other.307 In short, justice/fairness 
(the public’s right) and efficiency are interrelated concepts, achievable by the 
application of the PAJA.308 
The PAJA separates rights and expectations and further defines when 
an individual can demand procedurally fair administrative action. Section 3(1) 
of the PAJA details a fair process and applies this to administrative action 
that materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate expectations of a 
person, with a focus on there being either a right that is adversely affected by 
the administrative action or a legitimate expectation that is affected. This 
limits the burden on the public administrator and prevents a scenario where 
every action taken by government will be under scrutiny for procedural 
fairness; in addition, this allows for efficiency of government.309 Section 3 of 
the PAJA may contain the proviso of a “legitimate expectation”, but section 4 
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does not; the legislature did not provide the public with a right to procedurally 
fair administrative action affecting a legitimate expectation of the public. This 
demonstrates the drafter’s intention to carry through the constitutional focus 
of an effective and efficient administration. The PAJA also promotes the 
concept that the principles of fairness need not be applied uniformly in every 
case; section 3(2) of the PAJA states that a fair administrative procedure 
depends on the circumstances of each case, thereby allowing the principle of 
procedural justice to apply to all administrative action but modifying the 
content of fairness to suit the occasion, thus further allowing for efficiency of 
government.310 
The effect of all these principles and sections such as section 195(1) 
and section 33 of the Constitution, and the PAJA (especially its preamble), is 
that there is a duty on the administrator to behave as a “public servant” 
should, and to deliver services to the public in a manner that is lawfully and 
procedurally fair and reasonable. It is said that this idea of positive action is 
summarised in the public administration principle of Batho Pele – the people 
are first.311 Section 4 of the PAJA was specifically created to help determine 
and accommodate the public’s needs and to achieve the objective of 
government accountability. The normative requirements pertaining to the 
public administration and its relationship with the public as envisaged in the 
Constitution (transparency, accountability, responsiveness, efficiency) and 
repeated in the PAJA, must always be taken into consideration when the 
right to just administrative action is implemented.312  
A balance must be struck between the administrator “getting the job 
done” when delivering administrative services to the public and the need to 
protect individuals against the abuse of power by government.313 The 
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judiciary has a definite role to play in achieving the balance between 
efficiency of government and the protection of the rights of the public to 
procedurally fair administrative action. In order to achieve this balance, 
administrative law needs to facilitate resourceful decision-making that is in 
the public interest, but at the same time allow the public to assert their rights 
effectively and to limit abuse;314 in short, achieving the balance between 
empowering administrative officials while at the same time controlling those 
powers.315 The problem is that the judiciary often prevents the administrator 
from “creative decision making by having controls and imposing duties...that 
are applied to oppressively by courts.”316  
This problem is why Professor Hoexter’s argument that the courts 
should adopt a theory of deference, is so important.317 Hoexter318 argues that 
“variability” is an important concept that the judiciary should adopt. In 
essence, the courts should not have an “all or nothing” attitude when 
attempting to achieve administrative justice.319 Administrative justice must be 
“given out in appropriate doses to everyone.”320 In addition the courts should 
not take a rigid approach to judicial review of administrative action, but rather 
should rather apply “specific content in light of the particular administrative 
contexts” of the challenged action.321 In saying this, and considering the 
context of section 4, perhaps the challenge that our courts face lies in the 
broad interpretation of the word “rights”. Hoexter argues that the broad 
interpretation of “affected rights” in judgments such as the Goodman 
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Brothers322 provides evidence of a dire need for a theory of deference among 
the judiciary.323 
Some may argue that the judiciary adopting a theory of deference or 
judicial restraint when dealing with administrative action affecting the public’s 
rights would mean that it relinquishing its responsibility to uphold the rule of 
law.324 However, a practical and realistic approach in realising the 
responsibilities of both courts and administrative bodies assists with 
government efficiency.325 Administrators should not be unduly burdened, and 
therefore when challenging the legality of administrative action though judicial 
review, a coherent theory of difference should be able to achieve the balance 
between decision-making and accountability of government.326 
Skweyiya J in the Constitutional Court Judgment of Joseph and others v 
City of Johannesburg and others327 held that, “efficiency and capacity 
considerations are indeed an important aspect of any contextual 
determination of the content of procedural fairness.”328 Quoting from the 
judgment of Premier, Mpumalanga,329 Skweyiya explained that when 
determining procedural fairness, a court should be slow to impose obligations 
upon government that would constrain its ability to make and implement 
policy effectively. This principle is recognised in many other countries, and as 
the court in the Premier, Mpumalanga held, that one 
“cannot deny the importance of the need to ensure the ability of the 
Executive to act efficiency and promptly, especially in a young 
democracy like South Africa that faces immense challenges of 
transformation”.  
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5.3 Public participation, environmental and land use planning law – 
the public participation dilemmas 
Land use management and environmental law frequently use public 
participation. In terms of land use management, Raubenheimer330 argues 
that municipalities have a special duty to provide “substance to participatory 
processes.”331 It is procedurally unfair to curtail the right to be heard, which 
means that section 4 of the PAJA is important in the application of land use 
management in the municipal sphere.332 Planning law is applied in the local 
government sphere where municipalities use planning law to create spatial 
planning frameworks, and to manage land use and land development.333 
Planning legislation at the municipal level has included public participation as 
is evident from legislation such as the Local Government: Municipal Systems 
Act 32 of 2000 (Systems Act), which dedicates an entire chapter to the duty 
of municipal councils to encourage the involvement of the local community.334 
Section 4 of the Systems Act creates a duty on municipalities 
implement a system of participatory governance to allow communities to 
participate in the affairs of local government.335 When interpreting land use 
planning legislation, the courts have adopted a careful approach, balanced 
against the principle of legality, and more so in cases which involve public 
interest. This is clear in the matter of Hayes v Minister of Finance and 
Development Planning WC;336 the respondents had wanted to erect a four-
storey flat; however the erven belonging to the respondents were registered 
for residential use under Stellenbosch’s Municipality Zoning Scheme 
Regulations and were subject to restrictive conditions that only permitted 
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single-storey houses337 The respondents applied to the municipality to grant 
the necessary departures from the Stellenbosch Municipal Zoning Scheme 
Regulations but the court held that the applicable restrictive conditions had 
been imposed in favour of every owner of an erf in the township, which 
resulted in all erf owners in the township being bound. In terms of invoking 
the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967, a notice had to be sent to each 
owner of land directly affected by the removal of the restriction. The court 
held that as there had been clear failure to give proper notice to each erf 
owner in the township who was directly affected by the application, it was 
procedurally unfair and a breach of the principle of legality.338 
 In terms of environmental law, the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA), includes one of the most extensive 
public participation processes in South Africa.339 This paper has shown that 
the ideology behind public participation is a concept that evolved from 
democracy and the expansion of justice to all.340 Public participation is 
regarded as democratising the administrative decision-making process, and 
to advance the constitutional principle of public participation, a number of 
statutes provide opportunities for the public to provide input in matters that 
affect them.341 As a result of section 4 of the PAJA including the 
requirements for procedurally fair administrative action affecting the public, 
any legislation that provides for public participation must meet these 
requirements for procedural fairness.342 Therefore, land use, planning law 
and environmental legislation must refer to the various processes found in 
section 4(1)–(3) of the PAJA to meet the requirements of procedurally fair 
administrative action affecting the public. 
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The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development includes 
the theory that environmental issues are best handled with the participation 
of all concerned citizens. It is for this reason that the drafters of NEMA 
included public participation as a cornerstone of the legislation.343 Public 
participation is important in environmental law, as due to South Africa’s past, 
environmental policies have often been seen in the South African context as 
being an elitist or a “white issue”. By incorporating transparency and the 
participation of the public in environmental issues, environmental actions and 
policies will improve.344 NEMA is clear about the commitment to public 
participation. Section 2 sets out the national environmental principles and 
section 2(4) in particular sets out the factors that are important aspects of 
sustainable development. Section 2(4)(f) considers the participation of all 
interested and affected parties in environmental governance as important in 
promoting sustainable development. The right of access to environmental 
information is an important aspect of public participation, and section 31 of 
NEMA sets out the application of this right in respect of environmental 
management.345 Closely linked to public participation is effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings, which NEMA includes in terms of 
section 32.346 Section 32 enforces legal standing for members of the public 
wanting to seek appropriate relief in respect of a breach of their 
environmental rights and those statutory provisions in terms of NEMA. 
Although it is clear that through the proclamation of NEMA, public 
participation in environmental law exists, considering the legacy of apartheid, 
public participation in South Africa is challenging, especially with the cultural, 
linguistic and economical divides among communities.347 A further challenge 
to proper public participation is the increasing pressure the public places on 
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government in relation to job creation, economic growth, and infrastructure 
development.348 Unfortunately, although the public participation procedure is 
necessary, it cannot be considered separate from South Africa’s political and 
cultural context.349 Administrative decision-making in pre-1994 South Africa 
was deeply unfair and hierarchical. Regarding land and environmental law, 
conservation went hand-in-hand with dispossession.350 Post 1994, through 
policy development and legislation, Government has attempted to curtail the 
injustices of the past, but implementation of these policies and laws has been 
weak.351  
In the context of the social division between the privileged minority of 
South Africa and the underprivileged, uneducated and poverty stricken 
majority, many of the public participation procedures undertaken relating to 
land use and environmental legislation are characterised by interest groups 
and NGOs.352 The economic status of the minority affects their participation 
in environmental matters that concern them, as is evident from most matters 
involving development. It is the wealthy and affluent who make up the 
majority of interest groups and NGOs.353 The poor uneducated South African 
lacks the ability to effectively engage in the public participation procedure, 
and frankly has greater concerns such as hunger and the lack of adequate 
housing to focus on. It seems unlikely therefore that this majority will pay 
attention to notices regarding public participation meetings or respond to the 
request for comments; thus the inability to fully participate in matters affecting 
them, means the voice of the impoverished South Africa is not heard. The 
need for fairness in public participation is crucial as it enables the poor to 
participate in decision-making. Fairness includes increasing opportunity and 
capacitating the poor, in other words the practical constraints hindering 
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participation by the poor in South Africa should be addressed.354 If 
government does not address these constraints, the public participation 
process will continue to be dominated by interest groups and will not be 
owned by the citizens of South Africa.  
5.4 Considering public participation as an ineffective tool  
Often the motivation behind enhanced citizen participation is the 
consideration of the merits of the process and an acceptance of the theory 
that an engaged public is better than a passive public.355 South Africa’s 
historical lack of transparency may have been the real motivator for 
government to promote participation. In the new democracy, government 
required citizens to have faith in the government to move forward and away 
from South Africa’s secret sovereign state. Whatever may have been the 
motivation, it is clear that there are ample benefits from incorporating a public 
process, but there are also negatives and disadvantages that may 
accompany the public participation process. 
Irvin and Stansbury in their journal article detailing the disadvantages of 
citizen participation in the United States of America claim that not only is 
citizen participation in government decision-making time consuming, it is also 
pointless if the decision is ignored.356 The participation is time-consuming, 
costly to government and often has a “boomerang” effect by creating an even 
more hostile attitude towards the government. Another disadvantage is that 
public participation could result in the policy decision being heavily influenced 
by opposing interest groups.357 Government may lose control of its decision-
making power, which in turn may result in a bad decision that is politically 
impossible to ignore.358 
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Citizen-participation requires a heavy time commitment; administrative 
decisions are therefore affected and decisions take place slowly; government 
decisions taken without convening a public forum are slow enough. It has 
also been said that the participation process can pull resources away from a 
government agency’s real aim and mission.359 Furthermore, public 
participation is often met with the challenge of citizenry apathy and no 
guarantee that a representative of a certain community is influential in that 
community.360 A further concern about representivity in public participation is 
that participants are not paid for their time, which means that the public 
participation process may be dominated by the wealthy and those who can 
afford to participate regularly.361 In addition, as the public becomes more 
involved in the decision-making process of government, their expectations 
inevitably become exaggerated; citizens expect their input to be considered 
and that the administrative decision will be taken as per their influence. This 
unfortunately can result in increased public dissatisfaction.362 
5.5 Conclusion 
The PAJA was created to promote an efficient administration. Administrative 
action must not only be procedurally fair, but it must also be efficient, 
although efficiency should not have an impact on the effectiveness of the 
administrative action. It has been shown that the public participation 
procedure contains a number of difficulties (time, cost, difficulty in reaching 
all affected) that hinder efficiency, more so in socially, economically and 
culturally divided South Africa. With the democratic principles accountability, 
responsiveness and openness, it is difficult to justify public participation not 
being essential. The courts, however, play an important role in giving out 
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administrative action in “proper doses”363 and in developing a theory of 
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CHAPTER 6 THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
6.1 Introduction 
It often argued that the words “constitutionalism” and “democracy” are 
contradictory.364 The argument contains some truth as these principles may 
oppose each other in a certain sense: democracy means the unified and 
unconstrained will of the people, whereas constitutionalism refers to the 
division or restraint of power.365 Some may argue that it is important that the 
people of a democracy should be free to redefine their rules whenever they 
desire, and should not be tied down to one definition of what democracy 
entails.366 Bellamy and Castiglione argue that if this is so, and democracy is 
interpreted as the “people’s rule”, then even more should the “people” define 
their own rules.367  
The limitation to the “people’s will” is unavoidable as constitutionalism 
requires that certain power be restrained in order in to lay the foundation of 
an open and democratic society.368 So in essence constitutionalism gives 
way to democracy, and democracy and constitutionalism can even at times 
be interchangeable, as can be seen in the development of the 
internationalisation of administrative justice. The concept of administrative 
justice as a constitutional right is considered by many democracies. The 
European Union Charter of Rights, under chapter V at Article 41,369 confers a 
right to good administrative action and testifies that the international arena 
has moved towards the theory that the right to a good administration is an 
inalienable right that allows citizens to take part in the government of their 
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country. The international perspective considers good administrative action 
as that which is fair, impartial and reasonably timeous.  
Article 41 of the European Union Charter of Rights includes the right to 
be heard before a decision is taken by an institution; this further reiterates the 
world view regarding participation in decisions that adversely affect an 
individual. The international arena promotes equal access to public service 
and the right of citizens to partake in government as is clear from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that: 
“1.  Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country 
directly or through freely chosen representatives. 
 2.  Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his 
country. 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; 
this will, shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which 
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” 370 
 South Africa has moved from a culture of limited public participation 
and secrecy to one with a legislative duty on government to include the will of 
the people and listen to the people’s voice when making decisions that affect 
them. South Africa’s answer to public participation in administrative decisions 
is section 4 of the PAJA, although this section also allows for limitations, 
variations and departures from the requirements of procedural fair 
administrative action affecting the rights of the public.  
The South African government has a legislative duty to consider public 
participation; however, to promote efficiency, the courts have adopted an 
attitude of deference. Is this the correct attitude? Should South African 
jurisprudence consider the promotion of efficiency as more important than the 
voice of the public? At this point it is helpful to consider foreign jurisprudence 
to gain insight into the various methods of including the “will of the people”. 
                                            
 




Similarly to South Africa, German administrative law differentiates between 
administrative law that affects the individual and that which affects the public 
in general. Under German law, persons who have their individual rights 
violated by the public authority have a constitutional right to judicial 
review.371Administrative action that affects the public at large is labelled a 
“general order” (allgemeinvergügung).372 In German administrative law, the 
right to a hearing can be terminated when an administrator issues a general 
order; further where it is impractical to issue an individual notice of the 
administrative action affecting a particular person, the administrator may 
promulgate a general order publicly, and in this instance no statement of 
reason is required.373 The right to be heard and the right to access to 
information is only available to an individual who is directly affected by 
administrative action, therefore the common administrative remedies 
available in German administrative law are only available to the individual 
and not to the public. This is to promote procedural efficiency, however there 
are certain scholars who believe that this does not conform to the rule of law 
and flouts good governance.374 Although there is no specific reference to 
procedural fairness in German administrative law, there are German Federal 
Constitutional Court decisions that have held that administrative action must 
be procedurally fair, more so when that action affects an individual’s 
fundamental right to procedural fairness.375 German law also considers the 
right to human dignity as relevant and requires administrators to treat 
                                            
 
371 J Pietzcker “Individual rights, the external effect on administrative action and judicial 
review” in Corder & Van Der Vijver (eds) Administrative Justice (2002) at 101. 
372Mass op cit (136) at 69. 
373Ibid. 
374Ibid. 
375 C Wefelmeier “Public Participation in German Administrative and Environmental Law” in 
Lange and Wessels (eds) The right to Know (2004) at 101. 
72 
 
individuals with concern, instead of viewing individuals affected by 
administrative action as mere “objects of the administrative process”.376 
The German Federal Administrative Procedure Act 
(Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) provided little assistance to the public at 
large until the inclusion of a “planning law” section into the act. This section 
seeks to protect the rights of the public and reconciles the administrative 
decisions with the views of the public; the decision-making therefore includes 
making as much information as possible available to the public.377 The 
European Community Council (an entity of the European Union), directed all 
member states to incorporate an assessment of the effects of defined public 
and private projects on the environment. This resulted in German law 
changing to include an assessment of environmental effects, which requires 
the administrator assessing a development affecting the environment to 
obtain the public’s comments.378 It stipulates that a developer must submit a 
host of information to the administrator, including relevant information relating 
to the environmental effects of the development, a description of the 
property, and a description of the proposed methods to reduce or avoid 
environmental issues. The administrator compiles a report based on the 
public’s comments and the information submitted by the developer. Although 
it would appear there has been some improvement in public participation in 
German law, there is no real subjective right to public participation, which 
renders the aforementioned development rather ineffective, particularly 
considering the extent of protection relating to individual rights.379 
6.3  Canada 
Prior to 1980, Canadian administrative law was a collection of common-law 
rules developed by the courts that had an inherent power of judicial review, 
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which included the power to ensure that subordinate authorities acted within 
their jurisdiction.380 With the development of the Canadian Charter, the 
courts’ position has changed. The Canadian courts have the constitutional 
authority to review legislation and declare it invalid if it is inconsistent with the 
fundamental values of the Charter. The courts may review laws if they are 
fundamentally unjust, and further the courts will insist on a fair process 
whenever any person is deprived of a right to life, liberty or security. There is 
therefore an expressed constitutional right to procedural fairness.381 The 
courts of Canada approach administrative law and procedural fairness in a 
functional and pragmatic way.382 In fact, the term “pragmatic or functional 
analysis” is a term used by the Supreme Court of Canada which suggests its 
approach to most of the administrative problems that come before it.383 The 
Canadian courts use a pragmatic and functional approach to examine the 
context of administrative action, and in turn determine the content of the duty 
of fairness.  
  The Canadian case of Knight v Indian Head School Division 
No. 19,384 which dealt with an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal by 
Mr Knight, a director of education who had been dismissed after he refused 
the renewal of his contract for a shorter term than the original, illustrates the 
Canadian courts’ pragmatic approach to administrative law. The Supreme 
Court in this matter held that procedural fairness was due to the director of 
education, but the requirements of procedural fairness had been met in this 
instance.385 The Court held that although there is a general right to 
procedural fairness that is independent of any other statute, the right itself 
depends on the consideration of three factors which determine whether the 
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circumstances of the matter warrant the right.386 Where it is determined that 
there is a right to procedural fairness, the courts will consider whether there 
is any legislation that will limit the right completely.387 
 In assessing whether a duty to act fairly exists, the courts consider the 
nature of the decision by the administrative body, the relationship existing 
between the body and the individual and the effect of that decision on the 
rights of the person affected. The Canadian courts consider the duty of 
fairness via a cost-benefit analysis, i.e. “Is the harm likely to be avoided by 
affording the particular procedural right claimed greater than the likely cost of 
requiring it?”388 This pragmatic and functional approach to legal issues allows 
a judge to weigh up the relevant factors and exercise discretion when 
considering the circumstances of a case. By taking into account the social 
context and the likely consequences of a decision as opposed to focusing on 
the elaborate details of case law, judicial restraint and deference is promoted. 
It has been argued previously that deference can promote efficiency.  
6.4   The United States of America 
The United States of America (the US) bases its administrative decision-
making on pluralism. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the American 
Constitution contain the concept of “due process of law”. American citizens 
are protected against the arbitrary denial of life, liberty or property by the 
government without due process of law.389 The American courts have held 
that government actions that are “shocking to the conscience violate due 
process”.390 Although there is no constitutional entrenched right to just 
administrative action, there are rights that protect the public in its relationship 
with the government, namely the US rule-making procedure. The rule-making 
procedure of the US has been discussed earlier in this paper; informal rule 
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making allows for public comments through a notice and comment 
procedure.391  
American writers argue that this form of participation helps manage 
complicated socio-political disputes that are discovered during the public 
participation process.392 The American framework for administrative decision-
making is highly participatory; it began with regulatory agencies in the 
environmental and occupational health and safety field aiming to protect the 
public from any health and safety issues. The legislation establishing these 
agencies prescribed a notice and comment rule-making procedure.393 The 
increase of public participation in the US is linked to citizens’ distrust in the 
autocratic administrative expertise that claimed to make decisions in “the 
best interest” of the public.394 Therefore, by considering the rule-making 
process when making decisions, meaningful public participation is created 
which enables the administrator to make an informed decision.395 
 The American courts do not supplement legislative procedures in 
terms of rule-making; courts in the US tend to police compliance with 
procedural requirements.396 In addition, courts in the US scrutinise the quality 
of administrative decisions and place a duty on the administrator to show the 
rational connection between the facts they have found from extensive public 
participation and the decision that followed.397 
6.5   The United Kingdom  
Similarly to the United States, the United Kingdom’s (UK) administrative law 
embodies pluralist traditions.398 The UK principles of natural justice are 
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considered as a code for fair administrative procedure. It has been argued 
that the role the principles of natural justice play in UK administrative law are 
similar to the role that “due process” has played in the United States.399 The 
UK courts do not compel administrators to follow a participatory procedure 
outside the adjudicatory decisions. Public participation arises out of policy; 
these are standards rather than obligations and therefore have no real legal 
force, although generally these standards are enforced and government 
institutions comply with them.400 On account of parliamentary sovereignty, 
the rules of natural justice do not limit statutes. There is a presumption that 
parliament, when granting powers, expects administrators to exercise such 
powers in a just and appropriate way.401  
Administrative law in the UK does not contain a common law duty to 
consult; the duty arises when a minister issues an order to consult or 
formulates a policy, so the courts only impose a duty to consult where there 
is statute or policy that requires it.402 However, the courts abandon this 
approach where there is a legitimate expectation that the administrator 
should consult with the public.403 This legitimate expectation arises out of two 
situations: first, where it is an established practice that the administrator 
consults prior to making such decisions, and secondly where an existing 
policy affecting an individual or a group of individuals has the likelihood of 
changing, the administrator is obligated to consult with those affecting parties 
prior to making the change.404 
 The UK courts are different from the US courts where the focus is on 
public participation as an instrument to promote democracy and advance 
deliberation in administrative decision making. The UK courts tend to focus 
on using public participation as a means to avoid the abuse of power; 
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therefore where a legitimate expectation is concerned, a judiciary will enforce 
public participation to promote straightforward and consistent decision-
making by public bodies.405 The UK judiciary is sceptical of the inclusion of a 
right to public participation as it is argued that this suggests that the courts 
have difficulty in drawing a line regarding what is relevant consultation that 
would assist in the decision making and further that they find it difficult to 
prevent public participation from interfering with the separation of powers and 
the executive’s entitlement to formulate and reformulate policy decisions.406 
The problem that the UK courts find with an administrative law system 
that allows for “widespread consultation” is the possibility that this would 
generate “defensive forms of public administration” where the administrator’s 
decisions are constantly open to legal challenges.407 However, even though 
there is no real legal obligation to conduct public participation, once a public 
body proceeds with public participation, it is obliged to conduct the process 
efficiently and effectively.408 
  It is interesting to note that similarly to the Canadian courts, the 
United Kingdom’s traditional approach was in terms of the Wednesbury 
case.409 The courts in the past would only interfere with an official decision 
where the decision-maker had acted “so unreasonably that no reasonable 
authority could so act”; however this test for “gross unreasonableness” has 
been lowered in respect of matters involving human rights issues.410 
6.6 Conclusion  
There is no real right to public participation in the German Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act. Although there has been some development in 
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the environmental law sector in Germany with regard to the public 
commenting on the environmental effects of developer’s actions, the lack of a 
real right to hearing in respect of administrative decisions that affect the 
public does not assist the public participation cause. The pragmatic approach 
taken by the Canadian courts poses a similar problem. As these courts are 
hesitant to become involved in executive action, the monitoring and policing 
of fair procedure affecting the public is unlikely. However, both Canada and 
Germany argue that this promotes efficiency of administrative action. The US 
courts consider public participation as a way of promoting democracy, and 
the UK courts consider it as a form of restricting abuse. However, UK 
administrative law does not include a right to public participation, but rather a 
right arises where there is a legitimate expectation. Similarly to the Canadian 
courts, the UK courts limit interference with the executive, on account of 
separation of powers. Where does this leave South Africa, considering that 





CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
South Africa’s administrative law prior to 1994 encapsulates the secrecy, 
parliamentary sovereignty, lack of accountability and responsiveness of 
government that sums up South Africa’s historical context. Universal adult 
suffrage, the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law, 
accountability, responsiveness, openness and a government based on the 
will of the people are among the founding provisions of the Constitution. 
South African administrative law has come a long way from the limited 
consideration of the audi alteram partem principle with regard to 
administrative decisions that affect the public.  
South Africa has moved away from reactive measures by the courts to 
proactive measures that promote procedurally fair administrative action. Not 
only has the courts’ scope with regard to judicial review widened since the 
days of the ultra vires doctrine, but the public administration is encouraged by 
the Constitution to respond to the people’s needs and to encourage the 
public to participate in policy-making.411  
The question of why public participation is essential to democracy and 
procedurally fair administrative action has been asked, and the simple 
answer lies in two important facts. The first fact is that the audi alteram 
partem principle is an element of the common law duty of fairness, and this 
principle has expanded to include the public at large, which is evident from 
the South African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council412 matter. The 
second fact is that democracy is defined as “the people’s will” and our 
Constitution lays the foundations for a government based on the will of the 
people. Furthermore, public participation incorporates the essential elements 
of democracy: responsiveness and accountability of government. Based on 
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these two considerations, it is clear why public participation is essential for 
procedural fairness and democracy. 
Section 33 of the Constitution lists lawfulness, reasonableness and 
procedurally fair administrative action as a right. This, simply put, is the 
combination of the common law elements that an administrator must act 
within the ambit of the law. He or she must take a rational decision and follow 
a fair procedure which incorporates the right to be heard by an unbiased and 
impartial decision maker who has no vested interest in the matter. 
It can therefore be said that as public participation is an extension of the 
audi alteram partem principle, it is an essential element of procedural 
fairness; however, this paper has shown that the various types of public 
participation are laborious in nature and not always effective.  
The PAJA has been enacted not only to ensure that administrative 
action is procedurally fair, reasonable and lawful, but also efficient. This 
paper has analysed section 4 of the PAJA, and it can safely be said that 
although the PAJA considers public participation as a “path” towards the right 
to procedural fair administrative action, this path is by no means wide. The 
use of public participation is narrow in the sense that there must be an 
infringement of an existing right and not a mere expectation of a right. 
Further, the administrator can proceed with alternative methods to public 
participation, and use a fair but different approach or depart entirely from the 
section 4 of PAJA requirement, where it is reasonable to do so. The doctrine 
of separation of powers and the courts take on deference promotes 
efficiency. The courts seem hesitant to usurp the powers of the executive, 
and one could argue that the courts are following the trend of deference that 
is recognised in many other countries.  
Although this approach by the judiciary is essential for preserving the 
principle of separation of powers and efficiency, the judiciary should always 
remember that they have a policing function when it comes to administrative 
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action. As O’Regan413 said, an efficient government often goes hand in hand 
with illegitimacy and oppression; therefore efficiency must be both acceptable 
and fair. Having already concluded that fairness is achieved through public 
participation, if efficiency must be both acceptable and fair, it is therefore 
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